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HE subject assignedforthissession
covers too broad an area to be given even
a fairly cursory treatment in a single paper.
Accordingly, we have chosen to concentrate on
the part of it that relates to monetary factors
in fluctuations. We shall still further
narrow the scope of the paper by interpreting
"monetary factors" to mean the role of the
stock of money and of changes in the stock —
therebycasting the "credit" market as one of
the supporting players rather than a star per-
former —andby interpreting "economic fluc-
tuations" to mean business cycles,or even
more exactly, the reference cycles studied and
chronicled by the National Bureau.
The topic so interpreted has been rather out
of fashion for the past few decades. Before the
Great Depression, it was widely accepted that
the business cycle was a monetary phenom-
enon, "a dance of the dollar," as Irving Fisher
graphically described it in the title of a famous
article.'Different versions of monetary the-
ories of the business cycle abounded, though
some of these were really "credit" theories mis-
named, since they gave little role to changes
in the money stock except as an incident in the
alteration of credit conditions; and there was
nothing like agreement on the details of any
one theory. Yet it is probably true that most
economists gave the money stock and changes
in it an important, if not a central, role in
whatever particular theory of the cycle they
were inclined to accept. That emphasis was
greatly strengthened by the course of economic
events in the twenties. The high degree of eco-
nomic stability then achieved was widely re-
garded as a consequence of the effectiveness of
the monetary policies followed by the only re-
cently created Federal Reserve System and
hence as evidence that monetary factors were
indeed a central factor in the cycle.
The Great Depression radically changed eco-
nomic attitudes.The failure of the Federal
"The Business Cycle Largely a 'Dance of the Dollar,'"
Journal of the American Statistical Association, December
1923,pp.1024—1028.
[32]
Reserve System to stem the depression was
widely interpreted —wronglyas we have else-
where argued2 and elaborate below —tomean
that monetary factors were not critical, that
"real" factors were the key to economic fluc-
tuations. Investment —whichhad always had
a prominent place in business cycle theories —
receivednew emphasis as a resultofthe
Keynesian revolution, so much so that Paul
Samuelson, in the best selling textbook in the
country, could assert confidently, "All modern
economists are agreed that the important fac-
torin causing income and employment to
fluctuate is investment."Investmentwas the
motive force, its effects spread through time
and amplified by the "multiplier," and itself
partly or largely a result of the "accelerator."
Money, ifit entered at all, played a purely
passive role.
Recently, a revival of interest in money has
been sparked less by concern with business
cycles than with concern about inflation. Easy
money policies were accompanied by inflation;
and inflation was nowhere stemmed without a
more or less deliberate limitation of growth of
the money stock.But once interest was
aroused, it naturally extended to the cycle as
well as to inflation. In the United States, in-
deed, there has been something of a repetition
of the 192 0'S. A high degree of economic sta-
bility has been accompanied by a large meas-
ure of talk about an active monetary policy,
and the monetary authorities have often been
given credit for playing an important role in
promoting stability. As the experience of the
twenties suggests, this fair-weather source of
support for the importance of money is a weak
reed.
Examining the present state of our under-
standing about the role of money in the busi-
ness cycle, we shall first present some facts
that seem reasonably well established about
the cyclical behavior of money and related
'See our forthcoming "A Monetary History of the United
States, 1867—1960" (in press, 1963), Chapter 7.
'Economics, 3rd ed., 1955,p.224.
MONEY AND BUSINESS CYCLES
Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz
University of Chicago and National Bureau of Economic ResearchMONEY AND BUSINESS CYCLES 33
CHART I. —MONEYSTOCK INCLUDING COMMERCIAL BANK TIME DEposiTs, 1867—1960, AND CURRENCY PLUS
DEMAND DEPOSITS ADJUSTED, 1914—1960
—Currency held by the public, plus. demand deposits
plus commercial bank time deposits
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SOURCE: Friedman and Schwartz, "A Monetary History of the United States, 1867—1960" (in press, 1963), Table A—a, cols.7 and 8.These
are seasonally adjusted figures, dated as of end of month, 1867—1946; for 0947—60, currency plus demand deposits adjusted is an average
of daily figures, and commercial bank time deposits, a 2-month moving average of last-Wednesday-of-month figures,for a month centered
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magnitudes and then speculate about some
plausible interpretations of these facts.The
facts we present are drawn largely from our
own unpublished work done under the auspices
of the National Bureau of Economic Research
and associated unpublished work by Phillip
Cagan.
Some Facts About the Cyclical Behavior of Money
Cyclical pattern of the money stock.
The outstanding cyclical fact about the stock
of money is that it has tended to rise during
both cyclical expansions and cyclical contrac-
tions. This is clear from Chart i, which plots
(i) the stock of money from 1867 to 1960,
with money defined as including currency plus
adjusted deposits in commercial banks (both
demand and time) held by the nonbanking
public(i.e., excluding both balances of the
federal government and of banks); and (2)
from 1914 on, a narrower total which excludes
time deposits. From 1867 to 1907, our data
are at annual or semiannual dates; from 1907
on, monthly. The only major exceptionssince
to the tendency of the money stock to rise
during both cyclical expansions and cyclical
contractions occurred in the years listed in the
following tabulation, which gives also the per-







In addition, there were two minor exceptions
since the end of World War II,
1948—49
1959—60 I.'
The major exceptions clearly did not fall in a
random subset of years.Each corresponds
with an economic contraction that was major
as judged by other indicators;in the period
covered, there was no other economic contrac-
tion more severe than any in the list; and there
appears to be a considerable gapbetween the
severity of those contractions and of the re-
mainder, with the possible exception of the
contraction of 1882—85 which might be re-
garded as a somewhat borderline case.
For mild depression cycles, therefore, the
cycle does not show up as a rise and a fall.
Chart 2 gives the average reference-cycle pat-
CHART 2.—MONEYSTOCK: AVERAGE REFE1tENcE-CY-




terns for mild and deep depression cycles since
1867, excluding only war cycles.(Patterns
are given separately for the period before and
after 1907, because the availability of monthly
data after 1907 permits the construction of a
more detailed pattern —anine-point instead
of a five-point pattern.) The patterns for mild
depression cycles rise almost in a straight line,
though there is some indication of a slower
rate of growth from mid-expansion to mid-con-
traction than during the rest of the cycle (espe-
cially in the nine-point pattern for monthly
data).In itscyclical behavior, the money
















Nota: War cycles, not shown, are 1914—19 and 0938—45. Deep depres-
sion cycles are 0870—79, 1891—94, 0904—08, 1909—a!, 0927—33 and
0933—38.All others are mild depressioncycles.
Souaca: For method of deriving reference cycle relatives for the 9-
point pattern, see A. F. Burns and W. C. Mitchell, Measuring
Business Cycles, National Bureau of Economic Research,1946,
pp. 160-170; we used a variant of the National Bureau's standard
technique for annual series (pp. 297—202) for the 5.point pattern.
1.4trend —suchas population, the total stock
of houses, the number of miles of railroad
track in operation in the pre-1914 period, the
amount of electrical energy produced. In all
of these, the cycle shows up not in an absolute
rise and fall but in different rates of rise.
For deep depression cycles, the cyclical pat-
tern is nearer the stereotype of a rise during
expansion and a fall during contraction. From
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these patterns, it would be easy to conclude
that the two groups of cycles distinguished are
members of different species with respect to
the behavior of the stock of money.
Cyclical pattern of the rate of change in the
money Stock.
Because the strong upward trend of the
stock of money tends to dominate its cyclical
CHART 3. —MONTH-TO-MONTH RATE OF CHANGE IN U.S. MONEY STOCK, 1867—1960 II
I I I I I I I I4
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NOTE: Solid vertical lines represent reference cycle troughs; broken lines,peaks.Dots represent peaks and troughs of specific cycles,The
horizontal broken lines represent high and low steps in the rate of change.
SOURCE: In the annual or semiannual segment, 5867—1907, the change in natural logarithm from one date to the next in the data underlying
Chartawas divided by the number of months intervening, and the quotient plotted at the middle of the month halfway between.In
tht monthly aegment. 1907—60, the month-to-month change in natural logarithm was plotted in the middle of the second month.Ref-
erence dates are from the National Bureau (see Table a).
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behavior, it is desirable to eliminate the effect
of the trend in order to reveal the cyclical be-
havior more clearly. There are various ways
of doing this.4 The method we have used is to
take logarithmic first differences of the money
stock, which is equivalent to using the per-
centage rate of change from one time unit to
the next.Chart 3 plots the resulting series.
It is clear that this device effectively eliminates
trend. It is clear also that, as first differencing
usually does, it produces a highly jagged series
with a sawtooth appearance. The reason is
that independent errors of measurement in the
original stock series introduce negative serial
correlation into first differences.But despite
these short-term irregularities, the series shows
clearlymarkedcyclicalfluctuationscorre-
sponding to reference cycles.
Chart 4 gives the reference cycle patterns
for this series. They show a clear cyclical pat-
tern with the mild and deep depression cycles
distinguished,thistime primarily by their
amplitude, so that they now look more like
different members of the same species. The
peak rate of change occurs early in expansion
and the trough early in recession. Indeed these
occur so early as to suggest the possibility of
interpreting the rate of change series as in-
verted, i.e., as generally declining during ref-
erence expansion and rising during reference
contraction. We have examined this possibility
elsewhere.5 A full presentation of our tests is
See the discussion of this problem in Milton Friedman,
"The Lag in Effect of Monetary Policy," Journal 0/ Pout.
ical Economy, October 1961, pp. 453—454.
See our forthcoming "Trends and Cycles in the Stock
of Money in the United States, 1867—1960."
The patterns in Chart 4 differ in construction from the
reference patterns for the stock of money in Chart 2. The
rate of change series, being the percentage change from
month to month, is already in a form that is independent of
units of measure.In addition, the rate of change in the
money stock can be zero or negative as well as positive, and
hence its average value for a given cycle can hardly serve as
a base for computing reference cycle relatives.For these
reasons, the basic data, instead of being expressed as rela-
tives to the average for a cycle, are expressed as deviations
from the average for a cycle (as in A. F. Burns and W. C.
Mitchell, Measuring Business Cycles, New York, NBER,
1946, pp. 137—138). This is why the base lines in Chart 4
are labeled o instead of zoo as in Chart 2, and the scale is
in terms of deviations rather than of relatives.
Because of a discontinuity in the underlying money figures
in early 1933, we have estimated stage IX for the 1927—33
cycle and stage I for the 1933—38 cycle from the average
not feasible in this paper; it will suffice to note
that they rather decisively support treating the
rate of change series as conforming to the ref-
erence cycle positively with a long lead, rather
CHART 4. —RATEOFCHANGE IN MONEY STOCK: AVER-




NOTE: War cycles, net shown, are 5954—59 and 5938—45. Deep depres..
sioncycles are 5870—79, 5895—94, 5904—08, 1919—21, 5927—33,
and 1933—38.All othersaremild depression cycles.
Sousca: See footnote
thaninversely with a somewhat shorter lag.
Though we have not analyzed in as much detail
the narrower total of currency plus adjusted de-
mand deposits, its cyclical pattern since 1914
is very similar in general form to the pattern
of the broader total.
value for January, April, and May, 1933, instead of for
February, March, and April. Restricted deposits before the
banking holiday are counted in full in the recorded money
stock. However, after the holiday both restricted and un-
restricted deposits in unlicensed banks are excluded com-
pletely from the recorded money stock.That shiftin
treatment is the major factor behind the sharp decline In












Months from reference peek
20 30Cyclical timing of the rate of change in the
money stock.
Evidence on cyclical timing derived from a
comparison of turning points isclearly not
available from the stock of money series, be-
cause it has so few turning points.For the
rate-of-change series, we have dated turning
points in two ways: (i) We have sought to
approximate the series by a step function, with
successively high and iow steps, because at
times the series gives the impression of drop-
37
a low step ends, the date of a step trough. (2)
We have applied the usual National Bureau
specific cycle dating procedure to the rate-of-
change series, and have designated specific
cycle peaks and troughs. They are marked by
black dots in Chart 3.
Table igives the step and specific cycle
peaks and troughs we have selected, the dates
of the reference cycle turns with which we
have matched them, and the indicated lead
(—)orlag (+)atthe corresponding turn.6
TABLE I. —TIMINGOF SPECIFIC CYCLE AND OF STEP TROUGHS AND PEAKS IN THE RATE OP CHANGE
IN THE MONEY STOCK COMPARED WITH TIMING OF BUSINESS CYCLES
TROUGHS PEAKS
Date of:





















































































































































































SOURCE: Chart 3.Step peaks and step troughs are last months of alternate steps shown there.
Reference dates through Apr, 1938 are shown in BusinessCycle Indicalors, GeoffreyH. Moore, ed., Princeton University Press for NBER,
1961, Vol.p. 670; subsequent dates are from an unpublished National Bureau table.For timing comparisons, both the rate of change
series and th'esteps made from it are treated as well conforming, because of the nearly i-to-Icorrespondence between their turning points
and reference cycle turning pointsand because the money stock series from which both were derived has moderately high conformity in-
dexes (too for expansions, iorcontractions, +7I for trough-to-trough full cycles, + co for peak-to-peak full cycles, +6, for full cycles
both ways). Matching of step and specific cycle turns with reference turns follows Burns anJ Mitchell, MeasuringBussness Cycles, pp.115—128.
Earlier versions of this table were based on data now superseded.
ping suddenly from one level to a decidedly our money series starts in 1867, the first refer-
ence turn with which we have matched a specific cycle turn lower level, or of rising from one level to ais the peak in October 2873. Hence we do not match the
decidedly higher level. The horizontal brokenreferencetrough of December 1867, peak of June 2869, and
linesin Chart 3 indicate the steps we havetrough of December 1870. The absence of a specific cycle
turn to match with the December 2867 trough may simply used. 'We call the date at which a high stepresult from the fact that our series does not go far enough
ends, the date of a step peak, the date at whichback in time —apossibility suggested by the long average
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Clearly, leads predominate, and clearly also,
there is much variability.
Table 2 gives the average lead and the stand-
ard deviations of the leads for mild depression
cycles,deep depression cycles,all nonwar
cycles and all cycles, for both step dates and
specific cycle dates. For step dates, the aver-
age lead for all cycles is 7 months at the peak
and 4 months at the trough; for specific cycle
dates, the average lead is i8 months at the
peak and 12 months at the trough; for step
dates, the standard deviation of the lead is 6
months at troughs and 8 months at peaks; for
specific cycle dates, the standard deviation of
the lead is 6 months at troughs and 7 months
at peaks.
Estimation of timing relations by a com-
parison of turning points seems inefficient,
because it uses so little of the information con-
tained in the series. Therefore, we have experi-
mented extensively with other devices, in par-
lead at troughs. For the other two reference turns, we con-
jecture that the annual data for successive Januarys —all
we have for that period —mayconceal by their crudeness
turns that monthly data would reveal.This conjecture
seems especially plausible because of the unusual brevity of
the expansion phase, only i8 months, followed by a con-
traction of equal length.
ticular, cross-correlograms and cross-spectral
analysis.While thesedevices,particularly
cross-spectral analysis, offer great promise for
the future, as yet we have no substantive re-
suits worth reporting.
We have tested to determine whether there
is any secular trend in the leads or lags; whether
the pre-1914 timing, before the establishment
of the Federal Reserve System, differs from
the post-1914 timing; whether timing during
mild depression cycles differs from timing dur-
ing deep depression cycles; and whether there
is any relation between the length of the lead
and the amplitude of the subsequent or prior
cyclical phase. Our results so far are negative:
none of these criteria appears to be associated
with a statistically significant difference in tim-
ing.
Amplitude of movements in the rate of change
in the money stock.
i. The subdivision between mild and severe
depression cycles in Chart 4 corresponds to a
sharp difference in the amplitude of reference
cycles in the rate of change. This result sug-
gests that the amplitude of the changes in the
rate of change in the money stock is related to
TABLE 2. —AVERAGETIMING OF SPECIFIC CYCLE AND OF STEP PEAKS AND TROUGHS IN THE RATE OF CHANGE
IN THE MONEY STOCK AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF LEAD OR LAG, BY PERIOD AND TYPE OF CYCLE
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONSMEAN LEAD (—)ORLAG (+) IN MONTHS
STANDARD DEVIATION OF








Period TroughPeakTroughPeak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak
ALL CYCLES
1870—1908 8 9 8 9 —3.6 —5.8 —13.0 —15.6 5.7 7.7 6.7 8.3
1908—1960 13 12 13 12 —4.5 —8.1 —11.3 —19.1 5.7 8.3 5.2 5.5
1870—1960 21 21 21 21 —4.1 —7.1 —12.0 —17.6 5.6 7.9 5.7 6.9
WAR CYCLES
1908—1960 I 2 I 2 —20.0 —2.5 —10.0 —20.0 — 14.8 — o
DEEP DEPRESSION CYCLES
1870—1908 2 3 2 3 —6.5 —8.7 —20.0 —23.0 7.8 io.6 2.8 8.7
1908—1960 4 3 4 3 —i.o —8.0 —9.0 —15.7 2.2 9.2 5.5 4.6
1870—1960 6 6 6 6 —2.8 —8.3 —12.7 —19.3 4.8 8.9 7.2 7.4
MILD DEPRESSION CYCLES
1870-1908 6 6 6 6 —2.7 —4.3 —10.7 —11.8 5.4 64 6.o 5.6
1908—1960 8 7 8 7 —5.5 —9.7 —12.6 —20.3 6.3 6.9 5.3 6.3
1870—1960 14 23 14 23 —4.3 —7.2 —ii.8 —16.4 5.9 7.0 5.5 7.2
SouRce: Table s.To avoid duplication, each cycle is represented oniy by its peak and terminal
depression cycles are grouped as in Chart 2.
trough.War, deep depression, and mildRANK DIFFERENCE CORRELATION
OF AMPLITUDES
NBER Reference
NBER Reference Full Cycle
Specific Cycles in Rate of Trough- Peak-
Change in Money StockExpan. Contrac- to- to.
Correlated with: sian tion Trough Peak
Annual and semiannual
data 1879—1907 1882—1908
(8 pairs) (7 pairs)
Reference cycles
in clearings-debits.36 .64 .43 .68
Specific cycles in
Moore index .76 .85 .76 .79
Monthly data 1907—1960 1908—1960
('0 pairs) (io pairs)
Reference cycles
in clearings-debits.30 .54 .37 .57
Specific cycles in
Moore index .82 .58 .75 .8r
Whole-period data 1879—1961 1882—1960
('8 pairs) (17 pairs)
Reference cydes
in clearings-debits .27 .64 .45 .62
Specific cycles in
Moore index .70 .78 .77
the severity of cyclical movements in general
business, even though the timing of the changes
in the rate of change in the money stock is not.
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2.Oneway in which we have investigated
this relation further is to correlate the ranking
of the amplitudes of cyclical movements in the
rate of change with the ranking of the ampli-
tudes of the corresponding cyclical movements
in general business, as measured by two dif-
ferent indicators: one, bank clearings to 1919
and bank debits thereafter; the other, an index
computed by Geoffrey H. Moore. The cor-
relations, summarized in Table 3, are through-
out positivefor expansions alone, for con-
tractions alone, and for full cycles, for the
period before 1908 and for the period since, as
well as for the whole period.
The correlations between the rate of change
measure and the Moore index are sufficiently
high so that, even with the small number of
observations on which they are based, they
could hardly have arisen from chance. There
is a less close connection between the clear-
ings-debits figures and the rate of change, espe-
cially in expansions. The Moore index is ad-
justed for trend and reflects primarily changes
in physical units. Likewise, the shift from the
total stock of money to the rate of change is, as
noted earlier, equivalent to adjusting for trend;
in addition, it involves a change from a meas-
ure expressed in nominal units —dollars—to
a measure expressed in relative units —per
cent —andas a flow —permonth. The ampli-
tude of clearings-debits, however, is not ad-
justedforintracycletrend,and clearings-
debits are, in their original form, in dollars.
It would be interesting to know whether the
adjustment for trend, or the different weight
given to financial and physical transactions, is
primarily responsible for the closer connection
of the Moore index than of clearings-debits to
the rate of change.
The table as a whole leaves little doubt
that there is a fairly close connection between
the magnitude of monetary changes during the
course of cycles, and the magnitude of the
associated cyclical movement in business. The
relation is by no means perfect for the meas-
ures we use. But we have no way of know-
ing from this evidence alone to what extent the
discrepancies reflect the inadequacies of our
indexes of economic change, the statistical er-
rors in our money series, or a basic lack of con-
MONEY AND BUSINESS CYCLES
TABLE 3. —RANKDIFFERENCE CORRELATION BETWEEN
CHANGE IN RATE OF CHANGE IN MONEY STOCK
AND CHANGE IN Two INDICATORS OF GENERAL
BUSINESS, 1879—1961, EXCLUDING WAR CYCLES
AND 1945—49
NOTE: In our full study we have used three measures ofthe
amplitude of the change in money, each both in total and as a rate
per month, measuring the change in cycle relatives between reference
dates,betweenstepdates,and betweenspecificcyclepeaks and
troughs in the rate of change. To simplify our presentation here, we
restrictthe comparisontothetotalchange inamplitude between
peaks and troughs in the rate of change.
•War cycles 1914—19 and 1938—45 are omitted because of their
special characteristics. The 1945—49cycleis omitted because the ex-
pansion is skipped by the rate of change series(see Table i).No
tied ranks correction is used in getting correlation coefficients. 'Ampli.
tude" of i-ste of change in money stock is expressed in units of the data as
plotted in Chart above.For expansions, itis the change in stages
I—V of the specific cycle; for contractions, the change in stages V—IX
of the specific cycle.For clearings-debits the reference cycle ampli-
tude(stagesI—V—IX),expressedinreference.cyclerelatives,was
used.For the Moore index, specific cycle amplitudes only are avail-
able, but they have a one-to-one correspondence with reference cycles.
For fsll cycles, trough-to-troughthe change from V to IX was sub-
tracted from the change from 1to V to obtain the totalrise and
fallusedinthecorrelations;forfullcycles,peak-to-peakthe
change from I to V was subtracted from the change from V to IX.
SOURCE:Rate ofchangeinmoney stock:Figuresunderlying
Chartwere analyzed for specific cycles, as in Burns and Mitchell,
MeasuringBusinessCycles,pp.115—141;matching of peaks
troughs with reference turns follows Table x -
Clearings.debits:Bank clearings outside New York City, monthly,
1879—1919; bank debits outside New York City, monthly, 1919—61.
1879—1942:SeasonallyadjustedfromHistoricalStatisticsofthe
United States, 1789—1945, Bureau of the Census, 1949,pp.324—325,
337—388.1943—61: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, Division of Bank Operations, mimeographed table, "Bank Debits
and Rates of Turnover" (C. RevisedSeries, 1943—52), December
23, 1953;thereafter FederalReserve Bulletin, adjusted.for seasonal
variation by NBER.ReferencecycleanalysisfollowsBurns and
Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 560—170.
Moore index: Unpublished memorandum by Geoffrey H. Moore,
extending table inibid., p. 403, and revising and updating table in
BusinessCycle Indicators,G. H. Moore, ed, Vol.I,p.104.An
average of three trend adjusted indexes of business activity —A.T. &
T.,Persons-Barrono, and Ayres —eachof which was analyzed for
specificcycles, suppressing specific cycle turns not corresponding to
reference cycle turns.40 MONEYAND BUSINESS CYCLES
nectionbetweenmonetaryandeconomic
changes.
3. To get further evidence, we have investi-
gated this relation in a different way using an-
nual data. For the period from 1869 to 1960,
we have annual estimates of net national prod-
uct, and also, of course, annual estimates of the
stock of money. For this period, we have com-
puted logarithmic first differences(i.e., year-
to-year percentage changes) of both series. We
have then computed moving standard devia-
tions (comparable to moving averages) from
theseratesof change involving 3, 4, 5, and 6
terms.To illustrate:for the 3-term mov-
ing standard deviation, we took the initial three
ratesof change (1869—70, 1870—71, 1871—72),
computed their standard deviation by the usual
statistical formula,7 anddated the result as of
187o—71;then droppedthe initial year and
added a year, computed the standard devia-
tion for the resulting triplet of rates of change
(1870—71,1871—72, 1872—73), and dated the
results as of 1871—72; andso on.
These moving standarddeviations are a meas-
ure of the variability of the rates of change —
inthe one case, of money; in the other case, of
income.If such a computation were made for
a strictly periodic series, say, a sine wave of
fixed period and fixed amplitude, and if the
length of the moving standard deviation were
the same as the period of the sine wave (or
an integral multiple of it), then the computed
moving standard deviation would be constant
over time, and its value would be equal to
times the amplitude of the sine wave.8 If
the length of the moving standard deviation
were shorter than the period of the sine wave,
the computed moving standard deviation would
fluctuate over time, its value never exceeding
the value just cited. The same proposition holds
if the length of the moving standard deviation is
longer than the period of the sine wave but not
an integral multiple of it, though it is perhaps
—
2
'Thatis, estimate of s. d. = , wherex
fl—I
isthe observation,themean, and isthenumber of items
in the group, in this example, 3.
8Letthe sine wave be wheret istime. Then
in is the period of the wave and A the amplitude, the wave
fluctuating from +A to —A.
obvious that, as the moving standard devia-
tion is lengthened, the standard deviation will
approach the constant value noted above, since
the fractional cycle becomes less and less im-
portantcompared to the whole cycles included
in the computation of the standard deviation.
Itfollows from these considerations that, for
our purpose, which is to see how the amplitude
of the cycles in the rate of change in the money
stock is related to the amplitude of business
cycles, we want to use a number of terms equal
to the length of the cycle in which we are inter-
ested.This explains why we have used 3, 4, 5,
and 6 terms, for the reference cycle since 1867
has averaged four years in length but has oc-
casionally been shorter or longer. As it hap-
pens, the results are not very different for dif-
ferent numbers of terms, so we present a chart
for only the 4-term results, though we give
somenumerical data for all.
One more point before turning to the results.
Net national product, which we are using as
an index of general business and whose fluctua-
tions we are interpreting as a measure of the
amplitude of business cycles, has a sharp up-
wardtrend, though a less steep one than the
moneystock has, so that it typically declines
absolutely during contractions.If we were to
take a moving standard deviation of its ab-
solute values, or their logarithms, the result
would overestimate cyclical variability because
ofthe intracycle trend, and the overestimate
would vary over time as the intracycle trend
did. Accordingly, to eliminate the effect of the
intracycle trend from our measure of vari-
ability,we have used logarithmic first differ-
ences for net national product as well.This
procedure is of the same class and for the same
purposeas the National Bureau's standard
technique of estimating full cycle amplitudes
by subtracting the change during contraction
from the change during expansion. However,
the use of first differences can also be taken to
mean that what we are calling the amplitude
of business cycles refers to a construct rather
different from the National Bureau's standard
reference cycle; it refers to a cycle in the rate
of change in aggregates rather than in the level
of aggregates. As is well known, for a sine
wave, the rate of change series has the same
amplitude and pattern as the original series butMONEY AND BUSINESS CYCLES 41
differs in phase, its peaks and troughs coming
one-quarter of a cycle earlier or three-quarters
of a cycle later than the peaks and troughs of
the original series.
Aside from removing the effect of intracycle
trend, another advantage of using the first dif-
ferences of net national product is that the re-
sults would be almost identical for total net
national product and net national product per
capita. Since population has grown at a steady
rate over periods of 3 to 6 years, the use of per
capita data would affectonly the moving
average of the rates of change but not the mov-
ing standard deviation.
Chart 5 plots the 4-term moving standard
deviations for money and net national prod-
uct.It should be noted that since we have
used natural logarithms, the vertical scale can
be interpreted directly in terms of percentage
points.For example, a value of .ioo means
that the standard deviation is equal to an an-
nual rate of growth of io percentage points.9
°Let p(t) be the continuous rate of growth from year
to year t + i, so that
Xs+i= eP(t),
The scale on the chart is logarithmic. The
reason is that, since the standard error of the
estimated standard deviation is proportional
to the (true) standard deviation, the standard
error of the logarithm of the standard devia-
tion is roughly a constant, regardless of the
size of the (true) standard deviation. Hence
the logarithmic scale makes sampling fluctua-
tions appear the same size throughout.
It is clear from the chart that there is a
close relation between the variability of money
and of net national product: the two curves
parallel one another with a high degree of
fidelity, especially when it is borne in mind
that standard deviations based on only four
observations (three degrees of freedom) are
where X, and X,÷1 aresuccessive annual observations.
Then log6X,+1 —log6X5=p(t).
Note also that
log6X,+i — =log0(i +
Butlog0(r + k)is approximately equal to k for small k.
Hencethefirstdifferenceisapproximatelyequalto
xt+I- xS
CHART 5. —MOVINGSTANDARD DEVIATION OF ANNUAL RATES OP CHANGE IN MONEY, 1869—1958, AND IN INCOME,
1871—1958, 4-TERM SERIES
SouRce: Money figures, described in source for Chart x, are annual averages centered on June 30.Incomefigures are annual estimates of
net national product, beginning 1869, from worksheets underlying Simon Kuznets, Capital in the American Economy: Its Formation and
Financing, Princeton for NBER, 1961.For computation of moving standard deviation, see subsectionof this section, and footnote 7.42 MONEY AND BUSINESS CYCLES
subject to a good deal of sampling variation,10
that the net national product and money series
are, so far as we know, wholly independent in
their statistical construction, and that both are
subject to an appreciable margin of error.
At first glance, it appears from Chart 5that
income has become more variable relative to
money over the period covered.Unless we
are mistaken, this is a statistical artifact. A
closer look at the chart will show that the
change comes shortly after the turn of the
century. Before 1900, the standard deviations
for money and for net national product are
roughly equal in magnitude; subsequent to
that date, the standard deviations for net na-
tional product are noticeably higher than for
money.The reason, we conjecture,isthe
changing statistical character of the net na-
tional product estimates, in particular, the role
played in them by interpolation between decen-
nial census years. The effect of interpolation
is to smooth greatly the year-to-year changes
and so to reduce the estimated standard devia-
tions.For the estimates before 1889,inter-
polation played a major role; for those from
1919 on, a much smaller role.11 For the inter-
mediate decades, the role of interpolation rela-
tive to independent data for individual years
became successively smaller. We cannot find
any clear indication in the description of the
statistical series that there was a sharp break
around 1900 in the role of interpolation. How-
ever, the data behave as if there were such a
break. For the period before 1900, we con-
jecture that the standard deviations appreci-
ably understate the variability of income. For
the subsequent period, itis much harder to
make a comparable judgment. The statistical
errors of estimation tend to raise the computed
standarddeviation;interpolationtendsto
lower it.
For money, the degree of interpolation in
theannualestimatesissmallthroughout
(interpolation plays a much larger role in our
'°A more precise statement for these data is hard to
arrive at, since successive first differences are not statistically
independent.
See Simon Kuznets, National Product Since 1869, New
York, NBER, 1946, pp. 90 if.These considerations have
the obvious implication that net national product estimates
are untrustworthy as a sourceofevidence on secular
changes in the amplitude of business cycles.
monthly estimates). Hence the standard de-
viations for money are probably overestimates
of the "true" standard deviations, thanks to
the errors of estimation. However, because of
the character of the basic data, such errors are
probably appreciably smaller than for net na-
tional product.
Aside from the shift in the level of the stand-
ard deviations for net national product, the
most striking feature of the chart is what ap-
pear to be fairly regular cyclical fluctuations,
of about 8 to '5 years in length, in the stand-
ard deviations of both money and net national
product; these are the counterparts of the long
swings that have received much attention.
However, a warning is in order about any such
interpretation of these results.The moving
standard deviations for successive years are
highly correlated because they have three out
of four items in common. As is well known,
a moving average applied to a series of random
terms will produce a series that seems to move
systematically; and the moving standard de-
viation is a moving average and so has the same
effect. For our purposes, what is important is
the parallelism of the two series plotted in
Chart 5,notthe character of their common
fluctuations.
Table 4 presents numerical evidence for all
four lengths of moving standard deviations we
have computed. Because of the break in the
net national product data, the results are given
separately for the period before and after
1899. We used 1899 as the dividing point be-
cause it is a census year. The results for the
separate periods are more meaningful than the
results for the period as a whole.
This table reinforces the visual evidence of
Chart 5andadds to it a number of important
points. One is that the correlation is generally
highest when the standard deviations are com-
pared synchronously;it is generally lowered
if standard deviations for money are compared
with either later or earlier standard deviations
for NNP though, for the earlier period, the
correlation is highest when money leads one
year for three of the four lengths of moving
standard deviations.If there be any lead or
lag for the later period, it is presumably less
than a year in length. The slightly higher cor-
relations for the later period for NNP leadingMONEY AND BUSINESS CYCLES 43
by a year than for money leading by a year
may reflect a lead of NNP by a fraction of a
year. A second point added by the table is
that the standard deviation for net national
product for the period after 1899 is roughly
double the standard deviation for money.12 As
a first approximation, therefore, the amplitude
of cyclical fluctuations in income is twice that
in money.
The correlations rise steadily as the number
of terms in the moving standard deviations is
increased.The rise presumably reflects the
smoothing of the standard deviations intro-
duced by the larger number of degrees of free-
dom and hence the reduction in the role of
chance fluctuations.Calculations not sum-
marized in the table indicate that the peak
synchronous correlation is reached for seven
terms. The fact that the mean standard de-
viationsriseislesseasily explained, since
these should average the largest for a period
equal to the average length of a cycle. The
explanation is presumably the existence of the
longer waves. We conjecture that the mean
standard deviation would continue to riseas
terms are added and reach a maximum at some-
thing like io toterms.
To summarize these results: They strongly
reinforce the evidence from the earliercom-
parison of reference cycle amplitudes. There
is unquestionably a close relation between the
variability of the stock of money and the vari-
ability of income. This relation has persisted
over some nine decades and appears no differ-
ent at the end of that period than at the be-
ginning, if allowance is made for the changing
characteristics of the statistical raw materials.
Cyclical behavior of velocity.
i.The. ratio of income to the stock of
money, which is to say, the income velocity of
money, has been rising in the post-World War
II period.However, over the whole of the
more than nine decades our data cover, it has
declined sharply, from 4.6 at the outset of the
period to 1.7 at the end. As a result, velocity
has frequently declined during both expansions
and contractions in general business. When
that has not been the case, velocity hascon-
formed positively to the cycle, rising during
expansions and falling during contractions.
When it has been, the cyclical effect has shown
up in a slower rate of decline in expansion than
in contraction. The average cyclicalpatterns
TABLE 4. —MOVINGSTANDARD DEVIATIONS OF ANNUAL RATES OF CHANGE IN MONEY AND NET NATIONAL PROD-







Mean StandardStandard Deviation of
Deviation Standard Deviation
(natural logarithms)
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT BETWEEN STANDARD
DEVIATIONS OF MONEY AND NNP
Money Leading NNP by: NNP Leading Money by:
(yearn) (years)
Synchro.






.052 .067 .023 .033
.054 .068 .022 .029
.057 .069 .021 .027
293 .535 .6i6 .476 .114 —.011 —.099
.364 .648 .718 .540 .263 —.049 —.163
.378 .672 .707 .657 .430 .044 —.252





.039 .o8o .028 .048
.089 .029 .046
.048 .029 .046
.051 .100 .029 .044
.003 .113 .345 .670 .589 .248 .036
.135 .243 .456 .814 .722 .472 .263
.216 .385 .608 .840 .820 .637 435





.042 .076 .027 .046
.047 .o8x .027 .044
.o5o .085 .027 .043
.053 .o8g .027 .042
.001 .141 .349 .591 .429 .049 —.026
.011 .242 .425 .687 .56i .302 .033
.172 .348 .534 .721 .665 .465 .266
.220 .404 .58i .748 .69o .536 .360
Soueca: Sameas for Chart
The same reason that recommends a logarithmic scale
for Chartalso suggests an advantage in making compu-
tations like those in Table 4 from the logarithms of the
moving standard deviations. We have done so for the period
from 0899 through 1960. The correlation results are quite
similar. The synchronous results are .6oo, .797, .83 7, and
.88o for 4,and6 periods respectively.
The ratio of the geometric mean of the standard deviation
of NNP to the geometric mean of the standard deviation of
money is 2.30, 2.25, 2.29, 2.13, for 3, 4, 5, and 6 periods
respectively. This method of estimation therefore suggests
that income is roughly 21/4 times as variable as money.portant role than it assigns to the discrepancy
between measured and permanent concepts.
3.This interpretation has been criticized as
assigning much too small a role to interest
rates.Henry A. Latané, in particular, has
argued that the whole of the movement of
velocity, both over longer periods and over the
cycle, can be accounted for by changes in inter-
est rates, higher interest rates leading to econ-
omy in the use of money and so to higher
velocities, and conversely.14 His analysis covers
a shorter period than ours does (1909—58).
4.There is no necessary contradiction be-
tween these two interpretations, the appearance
of contradiction arising primarily from our
definition of money as the sum of currency
plus all adjusted deposits in commercial banks,
Milddepression cyclesandLatané's definition of money as the sum of
currency plus adjusted demand deposits alone.
a. Time deposits in commercial banks ap-
pear to have a substantially higher income
elasticity of demand than currency or demand
I deposits have, so that the income elasticity of
20 30money by our use of the term is doubtless
higher than it is by Latané's use of the term.
This can explain why we find it necessary to
introduce an income effect to explain the sec-
ular decline in velocity, while he does not. To
put this point differently, we find that the
elasticity of demand for (real) money balances
with respect to permanent income is about 1.8
whenmoney is defined as we define it. This is
consistent with a corresponding elasticity not
much different from unity for Latané's nar-
rower definition, provided the elasticity for time
deposits is between 2.5 and 3.5.15 Furthermore,
since there is a considerable trend element in
the movement of interest rates over the period
Latané's analysis covers —as,of course, there
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of velocity, for mild depression and deep de-
pression cycles (excluding war cycles), are
given in Chart 6.
CHART 6. —INCOMEVELOCITY: AVERAGE REFERENCE
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NoTE:War cycles, not shown, are 1914—19and5938—46. Deep depres-
sion cycles are: 5895—5904, 1904—08, 19153—21, 5927—32,
and 1932—38.All others are mild depression cycles.These dates
differ from those shown in Chartsand 4, because they are
annual instead of monthly.
2.Inan earlier article,13it was demon-
strated that this cyclical pattern of velocity
could be largely though not wholly accounted
for by supposing that the amount of money
demanded in real terms is linked, not to cur-
rent measured income and current measured
prices, but to longer-term concepts of perma-
nent income and permanent prices. By this
interpretation, the amount of money demanded
rises during the expansion phase of a cycle in
greater proportion than permanent income, as
suggested by the secular results.However,
measured income rises in still greater propor-
tion, so that measured income rises relative to
the stock of money, and conversely during a
contraction. While this interpretation does not
rule out the possibility that changing interest
rates over the cycle play a role in the cyclical
behavior of velocity, it assigns them a less im-
Friedman,The Demand for Money: Some Theoretical
and Empirical Results, New York, NBER, '959, Occasional
Paper 68, reprinted from Journal of Political Economy,
August 5959, pp. 327—355.
"CashBalances and the Interest Rate —APragmatic
Approach," Review of Economics and Statistics, Nov. 1954,
pp. 456—460;also idem, "Income Velocity and Interest
RatesAPragmatic Approach," Employment, Growth,
and Price Levels, Joint Economic Committee, Hearings,
part io, 86th Cong., ist sess., pp. 3435—3443 (reprinted with
minor changes in Review of Economics and Statistics, Nov.
ig6o, pp. 445—449); and see Allan H. Meltzer, "The Demand
for Money: The Evidence from the Time Series," presented
at the Dec. 1961 meeting of the Econometric Society.
The elasticity of a total is a weighted average of the
elasticities of the components, the weights being the ratio
of each component to the total. Over the period from 1954
to ig6o, commercial bank time deposits have varied from 59
to 44 per cent of money as we define it.MONEY AND BUSINESS CYCLES 45
is in income for a much longer period —any
excess of the "correct" elasticity over unity
could readily be confounded in the statistical
analysis with the effects of interest rates. Our
own readiness to attribute the decline in veloc-
ity to income, despite the strong trend in in-
come, derives primarily from the consistency
of such an interpretation with a wide range of
other evidence, in particular, cross-section evi-
dence for different states in the United States
and for different countries.
b.It is plausible that the division of cur-
rency plus deposits between currency plus de-
mand deposits, on the one hand, and time de-
posits, on the other, is sensitive to rates of
interest, since the differential between interest
paid on time deposits and interest paid on de-
mand deposits (which can be and for long
periods has been negative) and on currency
(typically zero) can be expected to widen as
interest rates rise —andconversely. Hence a
rise in interest rates might be expected to lead
to an increase in commercial time de-
positsrelativeto commercial bank demand
deposits plus currency —andconversely.It
follows that the interest elasticity of demand
can be expected to be greater in absolute value
for currency plus demand deposits, than for
currency plus demand deposits plus time de-
posits in commercial banks.
c.The two preceding points have especial
importance for the longer-term movements in
velocity. For the cyclical behavior of velocity,
the distinction between measured and perma-
nent income can be combined with either de-
mand function, and will help to explain the
cyclical behavior of velocity.
Needless to say, neither definition
can be said to be "the" correct definition. Just
where the line is drawn between those tem-
porary abodes of purchasing power we choose
to term money and those we term "near-
monies," or "liquid assets," or what not,is
largely arbitrary. We have found it convenient
to draw the line where we do largely because
that enables us to use a single concept for the
whole of our period, since the distinction be-
tween commercial bank demand and time de-
posits did not acquire its current significance
—orindeed have much significance at all —
untilafter 1914. In the course of using it, we
have found it to have some other advantages.'8
In addition, even for the period since 1914, it
is by no means clear that demand deposits as
recorded correspond fully with the economic
construct Latané wishes to measure, namely,
deposits subject to check. The lower reserves
required against time deposits have given banks
an incentive to classify as large a fraction of
deposits as time deposits as possible. There is
some evidence that, particularly during the
192 0'S, banks managed so to classify some
deposits that were in effect demand deposits.
A full understanding of the behavior of money
in business cycles requires an analysis of the
components of the money stock, however de-
fined, and of near-monies as well, so, despite
our reservations about the meaning of some of
his data, we welcome Latané's analysis as a
valuable complement to ours.
5. A basically more important question is
the extent to which velocity can be regarded
as passively reflecting independent changes in
its numerator and denominator. This is the
presumption implicit in the cycle theories, pop-
ular these past few decades, that have regarded
investment as the dominant cycle-producing
factor.Thesetheoriesimplicitlytakefor
granted that an expansion of investment will
produce an expansion in income regardless of
what happens to the money stock.In their
most extreme form, these theories imply that
the magnitude of the expansion in income is
independent ofthe sizeof any concurrent
change in the money stock. If the money stock
Stillanother bit of evidence on which of the two
definitions of money isto be preferred isavailable. We
computed correlations like those in Table 4 for the period
1915—60 between the variability of the narrower definition
and the variability of net national product, and also between
the variability of our broader definition and the variability
of net national product. The broader definition has almost
always a somewhat higher correlation coefficient. The syn-
chronous results for standard deviations of varying terms
are shown in the following tabulation, giving correlation
coefficients between synchronous standard deviationsof
annual rates of change in money —definednarrowly and
broadly —andin net national product, for different number
of terms.
Definition
of Money 3.Term 4-Term 6.Term 7.Term 8-Term 9.Term
M1 .592.833.865.909 .937.931.912
M, .596.785.842 .883.907.899.874
=Currencyheld by the public, plus demand deposits
adjusted, plus commercial bank time deposits.
M, =Currencyheld by the public, plus demand deposits
adjusted.46 MONEY AND BUSINESS CYCLES
does not rise, then velocity will simply rise to
fill the gap; if the money stock does rise, velocity
will not rise as much or may even fall. The
most rigorous explicit theoretical formulation
of this position is in terms of either a "liquidity
trap" —aninfinitely elastic liquidity prefer-
ence function at a finite interest rate —ora
completely inelastic demand schedule for in-
vestment —azero response of spending to a
change in the rate of interest.Though few
economistswouldexplicitlymaintainthat
either the one or the other prevails currently,
or has prevailed during most of our past his-
tory, many would accept the logically equiv-
alent assertions that the rate of cyclical ex-
pansion or contraction can be regarded as
fairly rigidly determined by the rise or fall in
investment or autonomous expenditure, that
the link is far more crucial than any link with
the contemporary behavior of the money stock,
and can be reversed, if at all, only by a very
atypical behavior of the money stock. Some
relevant empirical evidence on this issue is
summarized in the subsection below on the
relative roles of money and investment.
Cyclical behavior of proximate determinants
of the money stock.
i.Changes in the stock of money can,
arithmetically, be attributedto changes in
three proximate determinants, each under the
immediate control of a different class of eco-
nomic actors:
a.High-powered money, consisting of cur-
rency held by the public, plus currency held in
bank vaults, plus deposits of banks at Federal
Reserve Banks. This total is either a conse-
quence of international payment flows and
associated gold movements, or of Treasury or
Federal Reserve policy.
b. The division of the public's money hold-
ings between currency and deposits, which can
be summarized by any one of a number of
ratios —ofcurrency to the money stock; of
currency to deposits; or of deposits to cur-
rency.This division is in the first instance
determined by the public, the holders of money,
though, of course, the public's decision is af-
fected by the terms offered by banks for de-
posits.
c.The relation between deposits and the
amount of high-powered money held by banks,
which can be termed their reserves. This rela-
tion can be summarized by either the ratio of
reserves to deposits or its reciprocal, the ratio
of deposits to reserves.This ratio is in the
first instance determined by banks though, of
course, their decision is affected by legal re-
quirements imposed by the government, by
the terms they must offer to obtain deposits,
and by the returns they can receive on the
alternative assets they acquire.
Given the two ratios, a rise in high-powered
money implies a proportional rise in the stock
of money. Given the amount of high-powered
money and the deposit-reserve ratio, a rise in
the deposit-currency ratio implies a rise in the
stock of money, because it means that less
high-powered money is required to meet the
currency demands of the public and more is
available for bank reserves to be multiplied
by the deposit-reserve ratio.Similarly, given
the amount of high-powered money and the
deposit-currency ratio, a rise in the deposit-
reserve ratio implies a rise in the stock of
money, because it means that each dollar of
high-powered money held by banks gives rise
to a larger number of dollars of deposits.
2.Phillip Cagan has analyzed in detail the
contribution of changes in each of these three
proximate determinants to the cyclical fluctua-
tions in the rate of change in the money
stock.17 He finds that the deposit-currency
ratio was the most important single contribu-
tor. Throughout the period from 1877to1954,
it accounted on the average for roughly half
the cyclical fluctuations in the rate of change
in the money stock.Though thisfraction
varied 'from cycle to cycle, it did not change in
any consistent secular fashion and was not
markedly different for severe and mild move-
ments. The main deviation in its contribution
occurred at times of money panics in which it
often played a dominant role.
Changes in high-powered money were as
large in amplitude as changes in the deposit-
reserve ratio but much less regular in timing.
Changes in the deposit-reserve ratio were reg-
17Seehis forthcoming monograph, "Determinants and
Effects of Changes in the U.S. Money Stock, 1875—1955," a
National Bureau study.MONEY AND BUSINESS CYCLES 47
ular in timing but relatively small in ampli-
tude.
3.Cagan finds that the main impact of the
Federal Reserve System has been on the rela-
tive importance of changes in high-powered
money and in the deposit-reserve ratio.By
providing banks with an alternative source of
liquidity,the Reserve System intensified a
tendency for banks to trim any excess of re-
serves over legal requirements —atendency
fostered in earlier decades by the Treasury's
assumption of enlarged money market respon-
sibilities. The result was a reduction in the
amplitude of cyclical movements in the re-
serve ratio after 1914.However,this was more
than offset by an increase in the amplitude of
cyclical movements in high-powered money.
4. The deposit-currency ratio had a rising
long-term trend to 1929, declined substantially
thereafter until the end of World War II, and
has since been rising. Relative to these longer-
term movements, the deposit-currency ratio
tended to rise during the early part of expan-
sions, at first at an increasing rate; to reach
a peak near mid-expansion; then to decline to
mid-contraction;and thentostartrising.
Cagan shows that these movements played an
important part in accounting for the tendency
of the rate of change in the money stock to
reach its peak around mid-expansion and its
trough around mid-contraction. He attributes
the timing of movements in the deposit-currency
ratio to divergent cyclical patterns in the veloc-
ity of currency and deposits.
5. The deposit-reserveratiorose during
most of the period covered, except for its sharp
decline during the later 1930'S.Relative to
trend,ittended torise during expansions,
reaching its peak before the reference peak,
and tended todecline during contractions,
reaching its trough before the reference trough.
6.These patterns bespeak a rather complex
feedback mechanism whereby changes in busi-
ness activity react on the stock of money. This
feedback mechanism has not yet been worked
out in the detail that would be desirable.
Relative roles of money and investment in the
cycle.
In an extensive statistical study using stand-
ard correlation techniques rather than the Na-
tional Bureau's cycle analysis, one of us in
collaboration with David Meiselman investi-
gated the relative stability of monetary velocity
and the investment multiplier.'8Both the
stock of money and the level of autonomous
expenditures are positively related to consump-
tion and to income over both short and long
spans of years. However, it turns out that the
correlation is generally much higher for money
than for autonomous expenditures. Moreover,
the partial correlation between money and con-
sumption, holding autonomous expenditures
constant, is roughly the same as the simple
correlation, whereas the partial correlation be-
tween autonomous expenditures and consump-
tion, holding the stock of money constant, is
on the average roughly zero, being sometimes
positive, sometimes negative.Similar results
were obtained for year-to-year and quarter-
to-quarter changes in the stock of money,
autonomous expenditures, and consumption.
Additional evidence is provided by correla-
tions between the variability of annual changes
in money and in consumption, on the one hand,
and between the variability of annual changes
in investment and in consumption, on the other.
Because there are occasional negative figures
for net capital formation, we used gross capital
formation as the measure of investment and
computed first differences of logarithms and
moving standard deviations of the first dif-
ferences,asin Table4,for money, con-
sumption, and investment. The synchronous
correlation coefficients we obtained are con-
sistently higher, both for the period as a whole
and for the period since 1899,formoney-
consumption variability than they are for in-
vestment-consumption variability.These are
exactly the same results as in the Friedman
and Meiselman study, although derived by a
wholly different procedure. For the full period,
the correlation coefficientfor money-invest-
ment variabilityisslightly lower than for
investment-consumption variability;forthe
period since 1899, slightly higher. In addition,
the partialcorrelation between money-con-
sumption variability, holding investment van-
"Milton Friedman and David Meiselman, "The Relative
Stability of Monetary Velocity and the Investment Multi-
plier in the United States, 1897—1958," in Stabilization Poli-
cies(in press, 1963), pp. 165—268, Prentice-Hall for the
Commission on Money and Credit.48 MONEY AND BUSINESS CYCLES
ability constant, is significantly higher than
the partialcorrelation between investment-
consumption variability, holding money vari-
ability constant; for the period since 1899, the
partial correlation between money-investment
variability, holding consumption constant,is
significantly higher than the partial correla-
tion between investment-consumption variabil-
ity, holding money constant, although for the
whole period, the former is lower. Essentially
the same results were obtained for the simple
and partial correlations with leads and lags.19
These resultsarestriking because they
contradict so sharply the widespread presump-
tion among economists that investment (or,
more generally, autonomous expenditures) is
the prime mover in cyclical fluctuations, trans-
mitting its influence to the rest of income via
a multiplier effect on consumption. So far as
these results go, they suggest that, for a given
stock of money, there is no systematic relation
at all between autonomous expenditures and
consumption —inexperience,themultiplier
effect on consumption is as likely to be negative
as positive.20 These results may of course be
misleading,because somecrucialvariables
have been neglected, or because the definition
used for autonomous expenditures is inappro-
priate, or for some other reason.But they
tend to be supported by preliminary results
for other countries, and we know of no con-
10The synchronous simple and partial correlation coeffi-
cients for the moving 4-term standard deviations of the first
differences of logarithms are shown in the following tabula-
tion for the full period and the period since
Simple Correlations Partial Correlations
Period TI'iM TIM 'iM.C
1870—1958 .749.404 .330 .703 .252 .044




Ifnet capital formationisused as the measure of
investment,first differences of absolute values must be ob-
tained. We calculated the standard deviation of those first
differences,and the logarithm of the standard deviation,
and then correlated the logarithms as above. There is a
trend element in these calculations that it would be desirable
to eliminate but, even so, the correlation coefficients are
similar to those described for the standard deviation of first
differences of logarithms.
'° investmentmultiplier isgenerallydefined as the
ratio of a change in income rather than in consumption to
the change in autonomous expenditures to which the change
in income is attributed.In these terms, the conclusion is
that the multiplier is as likely in practice to be less than
unity as greater than unity.
trary evidence for the United States.The
widespread presumption to the contrary that
unquestionably does exist, whether it be right
or wrong, does not rest, so far as we can see,
on any coherent, organized body of empirical
evidence.2'
Some Plausible Interpretations of the
Factual Evidence
The stock of money displays a consistent
cyclical behavior which is closely related to the
cyclical behavior of the economy at large.
This much the factual evidence summarized
above puts beyond reasonable doubt.
That evidence alone is much less decisive
about the direction of influence. Is the cyclical
behavior of money primarily a reflection of
the cyclical behavior of the economy at large,
or does it play an important independent part
in accounting for the cyclical behavior of the
economy? It might be, so far as we know, that
one could marshal a similar body of evidence
demonstrating that the production of dress-
makers' pins has displayed over the past nine
decades a regular cyclical pattern; that the
pin pattern reaches a peak well before the ref-
erence peak and a trough well before the ref-
erence trough;that its amplitude is highly
It is well established that (i) investment expenditures
have a wider cyclical amplitude than consumption expendi-
tures have relative to their mean value; (2) orders and other
seriesreflecting investment decisions,as contrasted with
expenditures, display a consistent tendency •to lead cyclical
turns; there is a high correlation between consumption
and income.
None of these is very strong evidence for the multiplier
effect of investment on consumption, which is the point at
issue.Itemisimply means that investment isa more
variable component of income than consumption is; it says
nothing about whether both fluctuate in response to com-
mon influences, investment influencing consumption, or con-
sumption influencing investment. Note that a strict multi-
plier model has no implications about whether autonomous
or induced expenditures should show wider absolute fluctua-
tions. Absolute fluctuations in induced expenditures would
presumably be wider or narrower as the usual multiplier
is greater or less than 2.
Item2 has more significance and has some suggestive
value.However, it may simply mean that decisions are
affected early by whatever also affects spending later on
(see page 6i, below). Item 3 is entirely irrelevant. Con-
sumption is a major component of income, as both are
measured. For multiplier effects, what is important is the
effect of investment on consumption. See M. Friedman and
G. S. Becker, "A Statistical Illusion in Judging Keynesian
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correlated with the amplitude of the move-
ments in general business.It might even be
demonstrated that the simple correlation be-
tween the production of pins and consumption
is higher than the simple correlation between
autonomous expenditures and consumption;
that the partial corre'ation between pins and
consumption —holdingautonomous expendi-
tures constant —isas high as the simple cor-
relation; and that the correlation between con-
sumptionandautonomousexpenditures —
holdingthe production of pins constant —ison
the average zero. We do not, of course, know
that these statements are valid for pins and,
indeed, rather doubt that they are but, even
if they were demonstrated beyond a shadow
of doubt, they would persuade neither us nor
our readers to adopt a pin theory of business
cycles.
If the only decisive statistical evidence for
money were comparable to the items just cited
for pins, it would correspondingly not justify
the acceptance of a monetary theory of busi-
ness cycles. At the same time, it is worth not-
ing that, even then, the monetary theory and
the pin theory would by no means be on all
fours.Most economists would be willing to
dismiss out of hand the pin theory even on
such evidence; most economists would take
seriously the monetary theory even on much
less evidence, which is not by any means the
same as saying that they would be persuaded
by the evidence. Whence the difference?Pri-
marily, the difference is that we have other
kinds of evidence. We know that while pins
are widely used and occasionally of critical
importance, taken as a whole, they are a
minor, if not trifling, item in the economy. We
expect the effect to be in rough proportion to
the cause, though this is by no means always
the case —arock can start a landslide. We
can readily conceive of an economy operating
without pins yet experiencing cycles like those
of history; we can readily conceive of large
autonomous changes occurring in the produc-
tion of pins, but we cannot readily conceive of
any channels through which such autonomous
changes could have wide-reaching effects on
the restof the economy.Men who have
thought about and studied these matters have
never been led to suggest the pin industry as
a prime mover in the cyclical process. In all
these respects, the monetary theory is on a
wholly different footing. We know that money
is a pervasive element in the economy; that
the stock of money is sizable compared with
other aggregate economic magnitudes;that
fluctuations of the kind we call business cycles
have apparently occurred only in an economy
in which "economic activities are...car-
riedon mainly by making and spending
money." 22Wenot only can conceive of the
money stock's being subject to large auton-
omous changes, but we can also readily conceive
of channels through which such changes could
have far-reaching effects on the rest of the
economy. Men who have thought about and
studied these matters have been led to give
money a critical role in their theories.
One more preliminary observation. The key
question at issue is not whether the direction
of influence is wholly from money to business
or wholly from businessto money;itis
whether the influence running from money to
business is significant, in the sense that it can
account for a substantial fraction of the fluc-
tuations in economic activity, lithe answer is
affirmative, then one can speak of a monetary
theory of business cycles or —moreprecisely
—ofthe need to assign money an important
role in a full theory of business cycles. The
reflexinfluence of business on money, the
existence of which is not in doubt in light of
the factual evidence summarized above, would
then become part of the partly self-generating
mechanism whereby monetary disturbances are
transmitted. On the other hand, if the influ-
ence from money to business is minor, one
could speak of a cyclical theory of monetary
fluctuations but not of a monetary theory of
business cycles. To illustrate again with pins:
Changes in business conditions doubtless affect
the production of pins, and no doubt there is
some feedback effect of changes in the produc-
tion of pins on general business. But, whereas
the first effect may well be large relative to the
total fluctuations in pin production, the feed-
back effect is almost certainly trivial relative
to the fluctuations in business. Hence we are
ready to accept a business cycle theory of pin
22WesleyC. Mitchell, Business Cycles: the Problem and
Its Setting, New York, NBER, 2927,ChapterII, and p. 62.50 MONEY AND BUSINESS CYCLES
production but not a pin theory of business
cycles.
The factual evidence summarized above goes
beyond the list of items we conjectured for
pins and contains some bits that are relevant
to the key question at issue. The most im-
portant is the fact that the relation between
money and business has remained largely un-
changed over a period that has seen substantial
changes in the arrangements determining the
quantity of money. During part of the period,
the United States was on an effective gold
standard, during part, on an inconvertible paper
standard with floating exchange rates, during
part, on a managed paper standard with fixed
exchange rates. The commercial banking sys-
tem changed its role and scope greatly. The
government arrangements for monetary con-
trol altered, the Federal Reserve System re-
placing the Treasury as the formal center of
control. And the criteria of control adopted by
the monetary authorities altered.If the pre-
dominant direction of influence had been from
business to money, these changes might have
been expected to alter the relation between
business changes and monetary changes, but
the relation has apparently remained much the
same in both timing and amplitude.23 Yet this
evidence is by no means decisive. As noted
above, Cagan shows that the public's decisions
about the proportion in which it divides its
money balances between currency and deposits
is an important link in the feedback mech-
anism whereby changes in business affect the
stock of money. The changes in monetary ar-
rangements have affected greatly the trends in
the deposit-currency ratio but appear not to
have affected its cyclical behavior. Hence this
part of the supply mechanism has been roughly
constant and has played a roughly constant
role over the whole period.
In our view, the most convincing evidence
supporting the idea that money plays an im-
portant independent part is not the evidence
summarized in the first part of this paper but
evidence of a ratherdifferent kind —that
garnered from study of the historical circum-
stances underlying the changes that occurred
23Seealso comments in Friedman, "The Lag in Effect of
Monetary Policy," pp. 449—450.
in the stock of money.24 This evidence is much
more clear cut for major movements than for
minor.
Major economic fluctuations.
Major movements in U.S. history include
the deep depressions used here to distinguish
deep from mild depression cycles in our classi-
ficationofhistoricalreference cycles(see
Chart 2 for the classification); the substantial
inflations which have occurred primarily dur-
ing wartime; and a few long-continued move-
ments in one direction, such as the generally
rising level of money income and prices from
1896 to 1913. With respect to these events, the
historical record justifies two important gen-
eralizations.
i.There is a one-to-one relation between
monetary changes and changes in money in-
come and prices.Changes in money income
and prices have, in every case, been accom-
panied by a change in the rate of growth of
the money stock, in the same direction and of
appreciable magnitude, and there are no com-
parable disturbances in the rate of growth of
the money stock unaccompanied by changes in
money income and prices.
2. The changes in the stock of money cannot
consistently be explained by the contemporary
changes in money income and prices.The
changes in the stock of money can generally
be attributedtospecifichistorical circum-
stances that are not in turn attributable to
contemporary changes in money income and
prices.Hence, if the consistent relation be-
tween money and income is not pure coinci-
dence, it must reflect an influence running from
money to business.
INFLATIONARY EPISODES. The second gen-
eralization requires little more than its state-
ment to be recognized as true for the infla-
tionaryepisodes.During periodsofU.S.
engagement in wars, the increased rate of
growth of the money stock stemmed from use
of the printing press, in more or less subtle
ways, to help finance government military ex-
penditures.During our neutrality in World
War I from 1914 to early 1917, it had its origin
"For the United States, since the end of the Civil War,
see our forthcoming volume, "A Monetary History of the
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in use by the Allies of their gold reserves to
finance war purchases here. During those war
years, the reflex influence of the rising tide of
business on the stock of money was in the
opposite direction to the actual movement in
the money stock, since business expansion of
itself tended to produce a worsening in the
balance of payments and hence an outflow of
gold or a decreased inflow.
The situation is equally clear from 1896 to
1913. The rise in the stock of money reflected
predominantly an increase in the U.S. gold
stock, which was part of a worldwide growth
of the gold stock emanating from the discovery
of new mines and improvements in techniques
of extracting gold from low-grade ore. The
domestic expansion alone would have made for
gold outflows.The feedback was therefore
counter to the main current.25
For the wartime episodes, the evidence is
equally consistent with a different theory, that
the independent force was a major shift in
government spending propensities;that the
shift in spending propensities would have had
the same effect on income and prices if it had
been financed wholly by borrowing from the
public at large with an unchanged money
stock, rather than being financed in part by
the use of monetary reserves (as it was in the
early years of World War I) or by government
creation of money (as in the other war years);
that it was not financed wholly by borrowing
because resort in part to use of monetary re-
serves and the printing press was politically
easier and perhaps financially cheaper.
Evidence from the study by Friedman and
Meiselman (discussed in the subsection on the
relative roles of money and investment, page.
47,above)ratherdecisivelycontradicts
this alternative explanation. In any event, the
alternative explanation will not hold for the
1896—1913 inflation, since there was no obvious
independent shift Of major magnitude in spend-
ing propensities. The only immediate factor
producing such a shift that comes to mind is
the income earned from gold production. How-
ever, although the increase in the stock of gold
over that period was large compared to the
Thispoint is discussed in more detail in Cagan's forth-
coming "Determinants and Effects of Changes in the U.S.
Money Stock, 1875—1955."
gold stock at the start and was capable of
producing large increases in the stock of money
via a multiplicative effect on other kinds of
money, the gold stock itself was a small frac-
tion of the total money stock, and the increase
in the money stock only a fraction of the in-
crease in money income. Hence, the value of
gold production was a small fraction indeed
of the increase in income.26 The increased gold
production could hardly have produced the
observed increase of money income through
any spending multiplier effect. But any effect
it might have had must have been through its
effect on the stock of money.
DEEP DEPRESSIONS.For deep depressions,
the historical evidence justifying our second
generalization is as clear as for the inflationary
episodes, though less well known and hence
less self-evident. A summary statement of the
proximate source of the change in the money
stock will in most instances enable the reader
to judge for himself the extent to which the de-
cline in the stock of money can be explained
by the contemporary change in money, income,
and prices.
1875—78: Political pressure for resumption. led
to a decline in high-powered money,
and the banking crisis in 1873 and
subsequent bank failures to a shift
by the public from deposits to cur-
rency and to a I all in the deposit-
reserve ratio.
1892—94: Agitation for silver and destabilizing
movements in Treasury cash pro-
duced fears of imminent abandon-
ment of the gold standard by the
United States and thereby an out-
flow of capital which trenched on
gold stocks. Those effects were in-
tensified by the banking panic of
1893, which produced a sharp de-
cline,first in the deposit-currency
ratio and then in the deposit-reserve
ratio.
1907—08: The banking panic of i9o7 led to
26Forthe United States from 1896 to 1913,thevalue of
the gold stock increased by roughly $1.4 billion or by about
$80 million a year; net national product increased from
about $ii billion in 1896 to $34 billion in 1g13 or at the
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a sharp decline in the deposit-cur-
rency ratio and a protective attempt
by banks to raise their own reserve
balances, and so to a subsequent
fall in the deposit-reserve ratio.
1920—21: Sharp rises in Federal Reserve dis-
count rates in January 1920 and
again in June 1920 produced, with
some lag, a sharp contraction in
Federal Reserve credit outstanding,
and thereby in high-powered money
and the money stock.
1929—33: An initial mild decline in the money
stock from 1929 to 1930, accom-
panying a decline in Federal Re-
serve credit outstanding, was con-
verted into a sharp decline by a
wave of bank failures beginning in
late 1930. Those failures produced
(i)widespread attempts by the
public to convert deposits into cur-
rency and hence a decline in the
deposit-currency ratio, and (2) a
scramble for liquidity by the banks
and hence a decline in the deposit-
reserve ratio.The decline in the
money stock was intensified after
September 1931 by deflationary ac-
tions on the part of the Federal Re-
serve System, in response to Eng-
land's departure from gold, which
led to still further bank failures and
even sharper declines in the deposit
ratios. Yet the Federal Reserve at
all times had power to prevent the
decline in the money stock or to
increase it to any desired degree,
by providing enough high-powered
money to satisfy the banks' desire
forliquidity,andalmostsurely
without any serious threat to the
gold standard.
1937—38: The doubling of legal reserve re-
quirements in a series of steps, ef-
fective in 1936 and early 1937, ac-
companied by Treasury sterilization
of gold purchases led to a halt in the
growth of high-powered money and
attempts by banks to restore their
reserves in excess of requirements.
The decline in the money stock re-
flected largely the resultant decline
in the deposit-reserve ratio.
A shift in the deposit-currency ratio and the
accompanying bank crises played an important
role in four of these six episodes. This ratio,
as we have seen, has a systematic cyclical pat-
tern which can be regarded as a feedback effect
of business on money. However, in each of
those episodes, the shift in the deposit-currency
ratio represented a sharp departure from the
typical cyclical response and, in at least two
(1875—78 and 1892—94), represented a sub-
sequent reaction to an initial monetary dis-
turbance that had no such close link with
contemporary changes in money income and
prices.Moreover, in two episodes (1920—2 I
and 1937—38), neither a shift in the deposit-
currency ratio nor bank failures played any
role. And such a shift has played no important
role in any of the large expansions in the stock
of money. A fractional reserve banking struc-
ture susceptible to runs is an institutional fea-
ture that renders the stock of money sensitive
to autonomous deflationary changes;hence
runs may frequently play an important role
in sharp declines.This feature, however, is
clearly not essentialfor a large economic
change to be accompanied by a large monetary
change in the same direction.
The 1907—08 episode is a particularly nice
example of the intermixture of autonomous
monetary disturbances and a feedback. The
failure of the Knickerbocker Trust Company
in the fall of 1907 converted what had been
a mild decline in the money stock as a result
of gold exports and a consequent decline in
high-powered money into a severe decline as
a result of bank runs and a consequent decline
in the deposit-currency ratio. The accompany-
ing sharp rise in short-term interest rates and
a premium on currency produced a large gold
inflow. The accompanying sharp intensifica-
tion in the business decline worked in the same
direction by its effect on the balance of inter-
national payments. Since the runs were pre-
vented from producing widespread bank fail-
uresthroughthe concerted suspension by
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rency, these feedback effects fairly promptly
reversed the money decline and, along with the
reversal, the business decline came to an end.
CONCLUSIONS FOR MAJOR MOVEMENTS. The
factors that produced the changes in the stock
of money are autonomous only in the sense
of not being directly attributable to the con-
temporary cyclical changes in money income
and prices.In a broader context, each of
course has its origins and its explanation, and
some are connected fairly clearly with longer-
term economic developments.There can be
no doubt, for example, that the silver agitation
was intensified by prior declining agricultural
prices, or that the financial boom in the early
1900's encouraged financial activities which
laid the basis for Knickerbocker Trust's fail-
ure,or that the worldwide declining price
trend of the 1870's and i88o's encouraged
exploration for gold and improvement of re-
fining techniques.
The narrower sense is, however, important
for our purpose.The question at issueis
whether the one-to-one relation between mone-
tary change and major economic change can
be explained by a relation running from eco-
nomic change to money, as a one-to-one rela-
tion between changes in pin production and
in economic activity could be explained ifit
existed.Such an explanation would require
that the changes in money be connected rather
rigidly with either the contemporary changes
in economic conditions or more basic factors
that could account alike for the course of
economic events and for the changes in the
stock of money. The demonstration that the
major changes in the stock of money have been
attributable to a variety of sources, many of
which are connected directly neither with con-
temporary business developments nor with
earlier business developments —whichthem-
selves can be regarded as determining the con-
temporarycourseofbusiness —therefore
contradicts any such explanation of the one-
to-one relation between economic change and
monetary change.
There seems to us, accordingly, to be an
extraordinarily strong case for the proposi-
tions that (i) appreciable changes in the rate
of growth of the "stock of money are a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for appreciable
changes in the rate of growth of money in-
come; and that (2)thisis true both for long
secular changes and also for changes over
periods roughly the length of business cycles.
To go beyond the evidence and discussion thus
far presented: our survey of experience leads
us to conjecture that the longer-period changes
in money income produced by a changed sec-
ular rate of growth of the money stock are
reflected mainly indifferent price behavior
rather than in different rates of growth of out-
put;whereas the shorter-period changes in
the rate of growth of the money stock are
capable of exerting a sizable influence on the
rate of growth of output as well.
These propositions offer a single, straight-
forward interpretationofallthehistorical
episodes involving appreciable changes in the
rate of monetary growth that we know about in
any detail.27 We know of no other single sug-
gested interpretation that is at all satisfactory
and have been able to construct none for our-
selves.The character of the U.S. banking
system —inparticular, for most of its history,
the vulnerability of the system to runs on
banks —cancome close to explaining why
sizable declines in money income, however
produced, should generally be accompanied by
sizable declines in the stock of money; but
this explanation does not hold even for all
declines, and itis largely irrelevant for the
rises.Autonomous increases in government
spending propensities plus the irresistible po-
litical attraction of the printing press could
come close to providing a single explanation for
wartime infiations, accounting for the coin-
27Though we have summarized here and have, ourselves,
investigated in detail only the U.S. experience since 1867,
this statement is deliberately worded so as to cover a wider
range of experience. For example, it is consistent with the
hyperinflations studied by Cagan ("The Monetary Dy-
namics of Hyperinflation," Studies in the Quantity Theory
of Money, M. Friedman, ed., University of Chicago Press,
1956, pp. 25—217) ;with U.S. experience during the 2830's
and 2840's, studied by George Macesich ("Monetary Dis-
turbances in the United States, 2834—45," unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, University of Chicago, June with U.S. expe-
rience during the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and
the Civil War; with Chilean experience, as studied by John
Deaver ("TheChileanInflationandthe Demand for
Money," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago,
1961); with the price revolution in the sixteenth century, as
studied by Earl J. Hamilton (American Treasure and the
Price Revolution in Spain, 1501—1650, Harvard University
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cidence of rising incomes and rising stock of
money without any necessary influence run-
fling from money to income; but this explana-
tion cannot account for peacetime inflations,
in which the growth of the money stock has
reflected a rise in specie rather than in govern-
ment-issued money; and it is not even a satis-
factory explanation for the wartime episodes,
since price rises in different wartime episodes
seem more closely related to the concurrent
changes in the stock of money than to the
changes in government expenditure.28
It is perhaps worth emphasizing and repeat-
ing that any alternative interpretation must
meet two tests: it must explain why the major
movements in income occurred when they did,
and also it must explain why such major move-
ments should have been uniformly accom-
panied by corresponding movements in the
rate of growth of the money stock. The mone-
tary interpretation explains both at the same
time. It leaves open the reasons for the change
in the rate of growth of the money stock and,
indeed, at this point is highly eclectic, taking
account of the fact that historically there have
been many different reasons.
We have emphasized the difficulty of meet-
ing the second test. But even the first alone is
hard to meet except by an explanation which
asserts that different factors may from time
to time produce large movements in income,
and that these factors may operate through
diversechannels —whichisessentiallyto
plead utter ignorance. We have cited several
times the apparently widespread belief in in-
vestment as the prime mover. The alternative
explanation for times of war, suggested above,
is a special application of this theory, with
investment broadened to mean "autonomous
expenditures" and government spending in-
cluded in the same category. But even for the
first test alone, we find it hard to accept this
theory as a valid general explanation: can a
drasticcollapseinautonomous investment
explain equally 1873—79, 1892—94, 1920—2 i,
1929—33, 1937—38?Capital formation at the
end of the seventies was apparently one and
one-half times its level at the beginning and
See Friedman, "Price, Income, and Monetary Changes
in Three Wartime Periods," American Economic Review,
May 1952,pp.622—625.
seems not to have slumped seriously at any time
during the decade, judging by the rough indica-
tions given by Kuznets' figures.2° The 1890's
saw some decline, but the following decade was
marked by a vigorous and sustained rise. The
1920—21 episode was destined to be followed by
a construction and investment boom.If the
experience of 1920—21 is to be interpreted as a
result of an investment collapse, that decline
must have been a consequence of the decline
in government expenditures and the subsequent
collapse of inventory speculation before fixed
capital expenditures had developed to take their
place. But why, then, did the sharp decline in
government expenditures after World War II
not produce a subsequent economic collapse?
Emphasis on inventory speculation involves a
highly episodic interpretation, since it charac-
terizes few of the other episodes.Surely, one
cannot adduce that in World War I, slow using
up of investment opportunities —oftenimplic-
itly or explicitly called on to explain why, from
time to time, there is allegedly a collapse of
investment or a position of stagnation —was
responsible for the 1920—2 I recession. This is
an equally implausible explanation for 1937—38
and, as already implied, for earlier episodes as
well.
Of course, in most or all of these contrac-
tions, the incentive to invest and the actual
amount spent on investment declined.The
question at issue, however, is whether the de-
cline was a consequence of the contemporary
economic collapse —triggered,we would say,
by monetary changes —orthe ultimate work-
ing out of autonomous elements of weakness
in the demand for investment that themselves
triggered the contraction.
Even if all these episodes of contraction can
somehow be interpreted as reflecting an autono-
mous decline in investment, is a sharp increase
in investment opportunities a satisfactory ex-
planation for the worldwide 1897—1913 rise in
money income? If money is not a critical link
but only a passive accompaniment of change,
how is it that China escaped the early years of
the Great Depression? We would say thanks to
being on a silver standard and hence having a
floating exchange rate vis-à-vis gold currencies,
nKuznets,Capitalinthe American Economy:Its
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whereas all countries linked to gold were en-
meshed in the depression. And how is it that
China had the most severe contraction of all in
the years from 1933 to 1936,whenour silver
purchase program drained silver from China
and caused a sharp decline in its money stock,
whereas the rest of the world was in a period
of business expansion? And we could extend
thislistof embarrassing questions without
difficulty.
We feel as if we are belaboring the obvious
and we apologize to any reader who shares that
feeling. Yet repeated experience has led us to
believe that it is necessary to do so in order to
make clear how strong is the case for the mone-
tary explanation of major movements in money
income.
Of course, it is one thing to assert that mone-
tary changes are the key to major movements
in money income; it is quite a different thing to
know in any detail what is the mechanism that
links monetary change to economic change;
how the influence of the one is transmitted to
the other; what sectors of the economy will be
affected first; what the time pattern of the im-
pacts will be, and so on. We have great confi-
dence in the first assertion. We have little
confidence in our knowledge of the transmission
mechanism, except in such broad and vague
terms as to constitute little more than an im-
pressionistic representation rather than an en-
gineering blueprint.Indeed, this is the chal-
lenge our evidence poses:to pin down the
transmission mechanism in specific enough de-
tail so that we can hope to make reasonably
accurate predictions of the course of a wide
variety of economic variables on the basis of
information about monetary disturbances. In
the section below on the relation between varia-
tions in income and money, we outline one part
of the transmission mechanism which can ac-
count for the greater amplitude of variation in
income than in money and on which we have
some empirical evidence; in the last section, we
sketch in a much more tentative way the major
channels through which monetary fluctuations
might be able to account for economic fluctua-
tions, both the major movements we have so
far been considering, and the minor movements
to which we now turn.
Minor economic fluctuations.
The case for a monetary explanation is not
nearly so strong for the minor U.S. economic
fluctuations that we have classified as mild de-
pression cycles as the case is for the major
economic fluctuations.Clearly, the view that
monetary change is important does not preclude
the existence of other factors that affect the
course of business or that account for the quasi-
rhythmical character of business fluctuations.
We have no doubt that other factors play a role.
Indeed, if the evidence we had were solely for
the minor movements, it seems to us most un-
likely that we could rule out —oreven assign
a probability much lower than 50 per cent to —
thepossibility that the close relation between
money and business reflected primarily the in-
fluence of business on money.
If we are inclined to assign a probability
much lower than 50 per cent, it is primarily
because the evidence for minor movements does
not stand alone. If money plays an independ-
ent role in major movements, is it likely to be
almost passive in minor movements? The minor
movements can be interpreted as less virulent
members of the same species as the major
movements. Is not a common explanation for
both more appealing than separate explana-
tions, especially when there is no well-tested
alternative separate explanation?
A fully satisfactory explanation of the minor
movements would require an explicit and rigor-
ously stated theory, which could take the form
of a series of simultaneous differential equations
describing the reaction mechanism of the econ-
omy, together with a specification of the joint
distribution function of the random disturb-
ances impinging on it, and a specification of the
systematic disturbances that could be intro-
duced into it. Our belief that 'money plays an
important role in minor movements is equiva-
lent to asserting that some of these differential
equations would contain the stock of money as
a variable; that disturbances in the stock of
money are among the random or systematic
disturbances impinging on the system; and that
these disturbances alone would be capable of
generating a path for such major economic
variables as money income, prices, output, and
the like, comparable to the path they actually
follow during mild depression cycles.MONEY AND BUSINESS CYCLES
One factor that has doubtless contributed to
skepticism about a monetary theory is the fact,
documented above, that fluctuations in income
are wider in relative amplitude than fluctua-
tions in the stock of money. We have seen
that income velocity varies positively over the
cycle, which means that income varies more
widely than money. We have seen also that the
standard deviation of year-to-year percentage
changes in income tends to be roughly double
the standard deviation of year-to-year changes
in the stock of money. How is it that such
small changes in money can produce so much
larger changes in income? Why should mar-
ginal velocity be systematically higher than
average velocity?
While we are far from having a rigorous and
comprehensive theory to answer this and re-
lated questions, in the next section we outline
one element of such a theory which can, in our
view, explain the difference in amplitude; and
in pages 59—63, we outline even more broadly a
tentative transmission mechanism.
Relation between amplitude of cyclical varia-
tions in income and money.
One of us has elsewhere suggested that hold-
ers of money can be regarded as adjusting
the nominal amount they demand to their
views of their long-run income status —itself
a measure of their wealth —ofthe long-run
level of prices, and of the returns on alterna-
tive assets.8° Let us neglect for the time being
the effect of returns on other assets, as well as
still other possible variables, so that we can
write the relationship for the community as
(I) = Ppf(yp),
where Md is nominal amount of money per
capita,is permanent prices, andis per-
manent aggregate real income per capita.8' The
capital letters here and later refer to magni-
tudes in nominal terms or current prices, the
The Demand for Money.
We call to the reader's attention the difference in this
notation from that in The Demand for Money. and y,,
here refer to per capita money and income, whereas in the
earlier paper they were used to refer to aggregate money and
income. The shift was prompted by the desire to simplify
the expressions that follow. The same shift is made for all
variables referring to money and income. The remaining
symbols all have the same meaning here as in ibid.
lower-case letters, to magnitudes in real terms
or constant prices.
Let us suppose further that estimates of per
capita permanent income and permanent prices
are compounded of two elements: (i) an ex-
pected average annual rate of change to allow
for secular trend at a rate of, say, a8 for income
and ap for prices; (2) a weighted arithmetic
or geometric average of past per capita in-
comes and prices adjusted for such a trend.
For the present, we shall assume thatand
ap are both zero, or alternatively that the
actual past record is replaced by the past record
adjusted for trends of a9 and ap in magnitude.
At the present level of discussion, this assump-
tion involves no loss of generality, since the
only effect of nonzero values of a9 and ap is to
add secular trends without affecting cyclical
fluctuations. On a more sophisticated level, it
would make a difference, since bothand ap
might be variables in the demand function for
money, the former since future prospects might
modify present demand for money, the latter
since it would affect the returns on some alter-
native assets.
We can then write:
(2) P9(T)=F[P(t);t<T]
(3) y,,(T) =G[y(t);t < T},
where P(t) and y(t) are measured prices and
measured real income per capita at time t, and
the functions are to be interpreted as saying
that permanent prices and income are func-
tions of the past history of measured income
or prices.If we consider discrete data, say,
annual data, we can approximate equations 2
and 3 by either
cc










(2b) logP,,(T) = —i)=w0log
1=0
P(T) + (i — log —MONEY AND BUSINESS CYCLES
00
(3b)log y3(T) = log y(T —1)=
1=0
log y(T) + (' —w0)log i)
where
z=
Note that, in both cases, we have assumed
that the same weights are used for income and
prices.
Suppose the community is regarded as al-
ways being on its demand curve for money.
Then an increase in the stock of money will re-
quire an increase in permanent income or prices
or both sufficient to make the community satis-
fied with the new stock of money, and these
increases can be brought about only by in-
creases in measured income or prices or both.
To illustrate:Suppose,forsimplicity,real
measured income and real permanent income
remain unchanged. Then from equation i, a
one per cent change in M will require a one per
cent change in P,,. But from equation
aone per cent change inwill require that
P(T)riseby more than one per cent, or by
4-percent for equation 2 a andpercent for
wo wo
equation 2b. But w0' and w0 are less than unity.
Hence, the percentage rise in measured prices
and income will be larger than the percentage
rise in money.
To be more specific and to allow for changes
in both prices and income, let us replace equa-




where y and 8 are numerical constants (or,
more generally, functions of omitted variables,
such as returns on other assets), all the vari-
ables are at time T, and we have dropped the
subscript d from M because of our assumption
that the amount demanded is always equal to
the amount supplied. In logarithmic form,
is
(4a)log M(T)log y + log
+8 log y9(T).
Substitute (2b) and (3b) into (4a), giving
log M(T) =log y + w0(i—8) log P(T)
+8 wologY(T)+ (' —w0)
[log —')+ Slog —
where
log Y(T)=logy(T) + logP(T),
i.e., Y(T) =measuredincome per capita. Re-
place the final bracket in byits equivalent
from (4a) for T —i,namely, [log M(T—
— log'y], and then solve (5) for log Y(T).
Thisgives




Differentiateequation 6 with respect to
M(T), allowing for the fact that P(T)
change along with Y(T). This gives
dlogY(T) i=—[i—w0(z—S)
d log M(T) Sw0
d logP(T) d logY(T)
dlogY(T)Xd log M(T)
Solve for d log V(T)/d log M(T) to get
d log Y(T)— i
" d logM(T)—w0[8+ (' —8)
whereis the elasticity of the measured price
level with respect to measured income, and can
be expected to be between zero and unity for
cyclical fluctuations (i.e., both prices and out-
put can be expected to move in the same direc-
tion as money income). We may designate
d log Y(T)/d log M(T) the money multiplier,
analogous to the investment multiplier, though
it should be noted that the analogy is somewhat
incomplete. The money multiplier gives the
ratio of the percentage change in income to the
percentage change in the money stock.32 To
get the number of dollars of income change per
dollar change in the stock of money, it is neces-
sary to multiply the money multiplier by the
income velocity of money.
It so happens that our earlier work furnishes
empirical estimates for the United States of all
the quantities entering into the right-hand side
of equation 8.Hence, we can construct an
estimate of the elasticity of money income with
respect to the money stock. These estimates
are as follows:88
Becauseof the assumption thatandaparezero, or
alternatively that the actual past record is replaced by the
past record adjusted for trend, what is here called a change
in the money stock is logically equivalent to a change in the
money stock relative to its trend, or to a change in the
rate of change.
Friedman, The Demand for Money.(x) A
log









This estimate is certainly remarkably close
to the estimate, based on Table 4, of the ratio
of the variability of income to the variability
of money.It will be recalled that we there
found this ratio to be almost exactly 2.0.So
esti-
Yet,
value of=0.4implies a weight for the first year of 0.33;
the value of 8 is from equation 9 of ibid.; the value
of ijisderived from Table x of ibid. by dividing the entry
for "implicit price deflator" in column (3) by the entry for
"money income" in the same column.
With respect to Ci), it should be noted that permanent
income and prices were computed in ibid. by equations
andrather than 2b and 3b. We have nonetheless taken
the resulting value of W'o in our present notation as an
estimate of w,.Thisis correct as a first approximation,
but in further work it would probably be better to work
directly with equations 2b and 3b.
With respect to (s), the number used is for aggregate
money income, not per capita. However, since the number
is the difference between the per month rates of rise during
expansion and contraction, and since population shows little
response to cycles, the per capita figures would be lower by
roughly the same amount for expansion and for contraction,
and hence the difference would be unaffected.
3'Oneway to see this is to consider the problem of
estimating directly the magnitude of the money multiplier
from data on actual year-to-year changes in the logarithms
of income and money. The first step would be to express
the first differences as deviations from some mean values,
designed to be the empirical counterparts of our theoretical
constructs: e3 + ii,,= theexpected rate of change in money
(permanent) income; and+=therate of change in
the stock of money that would be consistent with a rate of
change of ev in real income and a,, in prices. That is,if
money income, prices, and the stock of money all changed
at exactly these rates, all expectations would be realized and
there would be no disturbances to set the money multiplier,
as we have defined it, to work. This first step is accom-
plished in our moving standard deviation analysis by com-
puting,first, moving averages, and then expressing the
observed first differences as deviations from the relevant
average. Call these deviations from means, A' log V and
logM.
The second step would be to estimate the mean ratio of
logV to A' log M. But it would be undesirable to do
this by averaging the ratio of the one to the other, since
either might on occasion be close to zero (i.e., the variance
of the ratio is in principle infinite).It would be better to
estimate a value of, say, K in
A' log V =KA' log M.
But as a statistical matter, there is no particular reason to
prefer the estimate obtained by regressing A' log V on
A' log M to the estimate obtained by regressing A' log M
on A' log V. In its rigid form the money multiplier analysis
In such further exploration it would be de-
sirable to generalize this analysis in a number
of respects. (i)should not be treated as a
numerical constant. One would expect it to be
different at different stages of the cycle and
under different circumstances. Under condi-
tions of full employment and inflation, it would
be unity or close to it, which —giventhat 6
is greater than unity —wouldmake the money
multiplier a maximum of i/w0, or with our
would imply perfect correlation,sothe two regressions
would be the same except for statistical errors of estimate.
The "correct" regression then depends on the magnitude of
errors in A' log V and A' log M. As is well known, the
two simple regressioncoefficients give upper and lower
bounds to any estimates obtained by treating both variables
as subject toerror.The geometric mean of these two
bounding estimates is precisely the ratio of the standard
deviation of A' log V to the standard deviation of A' log
M.
have used the estimates of Wo,8, andabove
because they are available in published form. We have been
experimenting further with estimating demand equations
using annual data instead of cycle bases, and estimating Wo
internally from the money correlations themselves, rather
than externally. This work is still tentative but one set of
results may be cited, because they are at the moment the
most divergent from those given above.
For the years 1885—1960, one estimate of w0150,22 and
of & is 2.27. Inserting these along with=0.20into equa-
tion 8 gives an estimate of the money multiplier of 2.25, or
on the other side of the estimate of 2.0 from Table 4. In-
terestingly enough, this estimate is very close to the ratio,
formed from the geometric means of the computed standard
deviations, which ranges from 2.13to 2.32for different
numbers of terms (see footnote 22).
far as we can see, these two numbers are
mates of the same theoretical construct.84
statistically, they are almost completely inde-
pendent. The estimate in equation 9 comes
from the following sources: w0isbased on a
study of the consumption function which used
no data on money whatsoever; 6 is based on a
correlation between average cycle bases of
money and estimated permanent income; and
is based on the ratio of per month cyclical
amplitudes computed from average cycle pat-
terns of money income and prices. Hence, so
far as we can see, no one of these items uses in
any way the intracyclical movements of money.
Yet the estimate of 2.0 based on Table 4 has in
its denominator the average standard devia-
tion of sets, containing 3, 4, 5, or 6 years, of
year-to-year percentage changes in the stock
of money. The close agreement of two esti-
mates, statistically so independent, certainly
strongly suggests that the theoretical structure
which produced them deserves further explora-
tionMONEY AND BUSINESS CYCLES
estimate of w0,3.At the other extreme, if there
were extensive unemployment,might be close
to zero (though it is by no means clear that this
has been true in experience), which would make
the money multiplier a minimum of or
with our estimates, 1.67.Moregenerally,
plays an important role not only in any theory
along the general lines we have been sketching
but also in income-expenditure theories.36It
deserves much more systematic study than it
has received.(2) The demand equation 4
should be expanded to include interest rates
and perhaps the rate of change in prices.
Though our studies suggest that these are far
less important than income in affecting the
demand for money, interest rates do have a
statistically significant effect and, since they
have a fairly regular cyclical pattern, should
be included in a cyclical analysis. The
effect of expected trends in prices and income
should be allowed for explicitly and not simply
neglected, as we have done. Forcycle
analysis,the demand equationsshould be
estimated on a quarterly rather than annual
basis. Ingeneralizing to a quarterly basis,
it will no longer be satisfactory to suppose that
actual and desired money balances are always
equal. It will be desirable to allow instead for
a discrepancy between these two totals, which
the holders of balances seek to eliminate at a
rate depending on the size of the discrepancy.
This will introduce past money balances into the
estimated demand equation not only as a proxy
for prior permanent incomes but also as a
determinant of the discrepancies in the process
of being corrected. In addition, it will permit
lag patterns other than the simple exponential
kind we have used.
A Tentative Sketch of the Mechanism
Transmitting Monetary Changes
However consistent 'may be the relation be-
tween monetary change and economic change,
and however strong the evidence for the auton-
omy of the monetary changes, we shall not be
persuaded that the monetary changes are the
source of the economic changes unless we can
specify in some detail the mechanism that con-
SeeFriedman and Meiselman, "The Relative Stability
of Monetary Velocity."
nects the one with the other.Though our
knowledge is at the moment too meager to
enable us to do this at all precisely, it may be
worth sketching very broadly some of the pos-
sible lines of connection, first, in order to pro-
vide a plausible rationalization of our empirical
findings;second, to show that a monetary
theory of cyclical fluctuations can accommo-
date a wide variety of other empirical findings
about cyclical regularities; and third, to stimu-
late others to elaborate the theory and render it
more specific.
Let us start by defining an Elysian state of
moving equilibrium in which real income per
capita, the stock of money, and the price level
are all changing at constant annual rates. The
relation between these rates depends on whether
real income is rising or falling, whether wealth
is remaining constant as a ratio to income or is
rising or falling relative to income, on the be-
havior of relative rates of return on different
forms of wealth, and on the wealth elasticity of
demand for money. To simplify, let us suppose
that all interest rates in real terms (i.e., ad-
justed for the rate of change in prices) and also
the ratio of wealth to income are constant, so
that the wealth elasticity of demand for money
can be approximated by the elasticity of de-
mand for money with respect to permanent
income. If real income is rising at the rate of
a6 per year, the stock of money demanded will
then be rising at the rate of Sa,,peryear, where
S is the income elasticity of demand for money,
and prices will be rising at the rate of ap= aM —
Sa,,,where aM is the rate of rise in the nominal
stock of money per capita.For example, if
income per capita is rising at 2percent per
year, the stock of money at 4percent a year,
and S is 3/2, then prices would be rising at i
per cent a year.37If S andwere to be the
same, and the stock of money were to rise at,
say, io per cent a year, prices would be rising
at the rate of 7 per cent a year; if the stock of
money were to be declining at io per cent a
year, prices would be falling at the rate of 13
per cent a year.38
"These are roughly the actual values of a,,,ap, andaM
overthe go years 1870—1960 in the U.S. They yield a rather
smaller value of 8 than we estimate by multiple re-
gression techniques (roughly i.8).
"It may seem strange that a i percentage point difference
in the rate of change of the stock of money produces pre-6o MONEY AND BUSINESS CYCLES
Let us now suppose that an unexpected rise
to a new level occurs in the rate of change in
the money stock, and it remains there indefi-
nitely —asingle shock, as it were, displacing
the time path of the money stock. In tracing
the hypothetical effects of the higher rate of
growth of the money stock, there will be some
difference in detail depending on the source of
the increase —whetherfrom gold discoveries,
or central bank open-market purchases, or
governmentexpendituresfinancedbyfiat
money, or a rise in the deposit-currency ratio,
or a rise in the deposit-reserve ratio. To be
definite, therefore, let us suppose it comes from
an increased rate of open-market purchases by
a central bank.
Although the initial sellers of the securities
purchased by the central bank were willing
sellers, this does not mean that they want to
hold the proceeds in money indefinitely. The
bank offered them a good price, so they sold;
they added to their money balances as a tempo-
rary step in rearranging their portfolios.If
the seller was a commercial bank, it now has
larger reserves than it has regarded before as
sufficient and will seek to expand its invest-
ments and its loans at a greater rate than be-
fore. If the seller was not a commercial bank,
be is not likely even temporarily to want to
hold the proceeds in currency but will deposit
them in a commercial bank, thereby, in our
fractional reserve system, adding to the bank's
reserves relative to its deposits. In either case,
therefore, in our system, commercial banks be-
come more liquid. In the second case, in addi-
tion, the nonbank seller has a higher ratio of
money in his portfolio than he has had hitherto.
Both the nonbank seller and commercial
banks will therefore seek to readjust their port-
cisely a a percentage point difference in the rate of change of
prices regardless of •the magnitude of the rate of change of
money. Will there not, it is tempting to say, be a flight from
money as the rate of change in prices and hence the cost
of holding money rises? The answer is that we are com-
paring states of equilibrium, not the transition from one
state to another. In a world in which prices are rising at 7
per cent a year, the stock of money will be smaller relative
to income (i.e., velocity will be higher) than it would in a
world in which prices are falling at 13percent a year. But,
in both, velocity will be changing only in response to the
change in real income, which is by assumption the same in
the two worlds. Of course, it is possible that 6 is different
at different levels of cost of holding money; but that would
be an effect of a rather subtler kind.
folios, the only difference being that the com-
mercial banks will in the process create more
money, thereby transmitting the increase in
high-powered money to the total money stock.
The interposition of the commercial bank in the
process means that the increase in the rate of
growth of the money stock, which initially was
less than in high-powered money, will for a
time be greater.So we have here already a
mechanism working for some overshooting.
It seems plausible that both nonbank and
bank holders of redundant balances will turn
first to securities comparable to those they have
sold, say, fixed-interest coupon, low-risk obli-
gations. But as they seek to purchase these
they will tend to bid up the prices of those
issues. Hence they, and also other holders not
involved in the initial central bank open-market
transactions, will look farther afield: the banks,
to their loans; the nonbank holders, to other
categoriesofsecurities —higher-riskfixed-
coupon obligations, equities, real property, and
so forth.
As the process continues, the initial impacts
are diffused in several respects: first, the range
of assets affected widens;second, potential
creators of assets now more in demand are in-
duced to react to the better terms on which they
can be sold, including business enterprises wish-
ing to engage in capital expansion, house build-
ers or prospective homeowners, consumers who
are potential purchasers of durable consumer
goods —andso on and on; third, the initially
redundant money balances concentrated in the
hands of those first affected by the open-market
purchasesbecomespreadthroughoutthe
economy.
As the prices of financial assets are bid up,
they become expensive relative to nonfinancial
assets, so there is an incentive for individuals
and enterprises to seek to bring their actual
portfolios into accord with desired portfolios by
acquiring nonfinancial assets.This, in turn,
tends to make existing nonfinancial assets ex-
pensive relative to newly constructed nonfinan-
cial assets. At the same time, the general rise
in the price level of nonfinancial assets tends to
raise wealth relative to income, and to make the
direct acquisition of current services cheaper
relative to the purchase of sources of services.
These effects raise demand curves for currentMONEY AND BUSINESS CYCLES 6i
productive services, both for producing new
capital goods and for purchasing current serv-
ices. The monetary stimulus is, in this way,
spread from the financial markets to the mar-
kets for goods and services.
Two points need emphasis at this stage. The
firstisthat the terms "financial markets,"
"assets," "investment," "rates of interest" and
"portfolio" must, in order to be consistent with
the existing empirical evidence, be interpreted
much more broadly than they often are. It has
been common to restrict attention to a small
class of marketable financial securities and the
real capital it finances, to regard "the" rate of
interest as the market yield on such securities,
and the "investment" which isaffected by
changes in the rate of interest as solely or
mainly the items classified as "capital forma-
tion" in national income accounts. Some of the
empirical results summarized earlier are incon-
sistent with this view.39 To rationalize the
results, it is necessary to take a much broader
view, to regard the relevant portfolios as con-
taining a much wider range of assets, including
not only government and private fixed-interest
and equity securities traded on major financial
markets, but also a host of other assets, even
going so far as to include consumer durable
goods, consumer inventories of clothing and
the like and, maybe also, such human capital
as skills acquired through training, and the like.
Similarly, it is necessary to make "rate of in-
terest" an equally broad construct, covering
explicit or implicit rates on the whole spectrum
of assets.4°
The second point is to note how readily these
tentative lines on our sketch accommodate some
ofthe documented regularitiesofbusiness
cycles. The cyclical counterpart to our assumed
initial shock is the rise in the rate of growth of
the mOney stock that generally occurs early
in contraction. On the basis of the sketch so
far, we should expect it to have its first impact
on the financial markets, and there, first on
bonds, and only later on equities, and only still
later on actual flows of payments for real re-
sources. This is of course the actual pattern.
The financial markets tend to revive well before
"In particular, those in Friedman and Meiselman, "The
Relative Stability of Monetary Velocity."
40Seeibid. for a fufler discussion of these points.
the trough. Historically, railroad bond prices
have risen very early in the process. Equity
markets start to recover later but still generally
before the business trough. Actual expenditures
on purchases of goods and services rise still later.
The consistent tendency for orders to lead actual
purchases would of course be expected on this
theory, but it would follow simply from the
mechanics of the production process. Hence it
gives no definite support to this or any other
theory. It is simply a stage in the way any im-
pulse, however generated, will be transmitted.
The tendency for the prices of financial assets
to rise early in the pattern is quite a different
matter.If the initial impulse were generated
by an autonomous increase in spending on final
goods and services, it would be plausible to
expect the timing to be the reverse of what it
actually is.Of course, on the theory being
sketched, the precise timing will depend on the
source of the initial monetary impulse. How-
ever, under the banking structure of the United
States and other financially developed coun-
tries, whatever the initial impulse, commercial
banks will play a key role in transforming it
into an increased rate of growth in the money
stock, and this will impose a large measure of
uniformity on the outcome.
One other feature of cyclical experience that
our sketch may be able to rationalize and that
is worthy of special note is the behavior of the
deposit-currency ratio. The initial monetary
impulse is concentrated among holders of fi-
nancial assets and is then diffused to the rest of
the community. But this means, as we have
noted, that the redundant balances are initially
in the hands of asset holders with a high ratio
of deposits to currency. As the redundant bal-
ances are diffused, they spread to more nearly
a representative group in the population. Con-
sistently with this sequence, the ratio of deposits
to currency starts to rise early in contraction,
not very far removed in time from the trough
in the rate of rise in the money stock; the
deposit-currency ratio continues to rise during
the rest of contraction and early expansion but
then reaches a peak around mid-expansion, and
falls. The turning point, on this sketch, reflects
the point at which the net tide of redundant
balances has shifted from the financial com-
munity to the rest of the community.62 MONEYAND BUSINESS CYCLES
To return to our sketch, we had reached the
stage at which the demand for the services of
factors of production was rising, which means,
of course, a rise in money incomes. This will
tend to be partly reflected in a rise of the prices
of resources and of final goods; at the same
time, the prices of nonfinancial assets will al-
ready have been rising as demand shifted to
them from financial assets. These price rises
themselves tend to correct portfolios by making
the real value of monetary assets less than they
otherwise would be. The result is to reduce the
relative redundancy of monetary assets, which
sets the stage for a rise in the structure of in-
terest rates in place of the prior decline. The
exact sequence of rises in prices, whether it
affects first prices of final products, and only
later prices of factors and so shifts profit mar-
gins —andso on —dependson the structure
of the product and factor markets. Like the
relation between new orders and production,
thisis part of the transmission mechanism
common to all theories and tells little or nothing
about the generating impulse. This does not
mean it is unimportant. On the contrary, it
may well determine the sequence of events once
the stage is reached at which income is rising,
as well as the time duration of subsequent
reactions.
However, the important point for our pur-
poses is very different. It is that the process we
have described will tend to overshoot the mark;
it will not simply produce a smooth movement
to the new path consistent with the new rate of
growth of the money stock assumed to prevail.
There are two classes of reasons embodied in
our analysis that explain why the process will
overshoot. One, and in our view the more basic
theoretically, has to do with the demand for
money. At the higher rate of price rise that is
the new ultimate equilibrium, the amount of
money demanded will be less in real terms than
it was initially, relative to wealth and hence
income. But this means that, in the process of
going from the initial to the new equilibrium,
prices must rise at a faster rate than their ulti-
mate rate. Hence the rate of price rise must
overshoot. This effect is reinforced by that em-
bodied in the subsection, "Conclusions for Ma-
jor Movements." In the initial stages of the
process, money holders overestimate the extent
of monetary, redundancy, since they evaluate
money stocks at unduly low levels of prices;
they are slow, that is, to revise their estimates
of permanent prices upward, hence they initial-
ly seek more radical readjustments in their
portfolios than will ultimately turn out to be
required.(If this analysisisapplied to a
cyclical process rather than to our special case
of a shift from one moving equilibrium to an-
other, a second element from that part of the
section would also enter to produce overshooting
—aslow revision of estimates of permanent
real income.) The second class of reasons for
overshooting has to do with feedback effects
through the monetary mechanism. Two of
these have already been mentioned. First, the
effect of the initial assumed shock is to cause a
greater rate of rise in high-powered money than
in the money stock as a whole. But since there
is nothing about the shock that will permanently
alter the ratio of money to high-powered money,
it follows that the money stock must for a time
grow faster than ultimately in order to catch
up.Second, there is reason for the deposit-
currency ratio to rise in the initial stages of the
process above its long-run equilibrium level.
In addition to these two classes of reasons for
overshooting, which derive from the specifically
monetary elements in our sketch, there may of
course be those arising from the other elements
of the transmission mechanism common to
almost any theory.
The tendency to overshoot means that the
dynamic process of transition from one equi-
librium path to another involves a cyclical ad-
justment process.Presumably, these cyclical
adjustments will be damped, though no merely
verbal exposition can suffice to assure that the
particular mechanism described will have that
property. Presumably also, the extent of over-
shooting will not be negligible relative to the
distuthance, though again no merely verbal
exposition can suffice to assure that the mech-
anism described will have that property.
The passage from this analysis of a single
displacement of the rate of growth of money to
a monetary theory of partly self-generating
cyclical fluctuations is direct and has in large
part been embodied in the preceding statement.
It may be worth noting, however, thatit
would be rather more plausible to suppose aMONEY AND BUSINESS CYCLES 63
shock to take the form of an unusually high
or low rate of growth of the stock of money for
some time, with a reversion to a previous level
rather than a shift to a permanently new level.
Such a shock is equivalent to two shocks of
the kind we have been considering —but
shocks in opposite directions. Hence the shock
itself gives rise to a cyclical movement in addi-
tion to the cyclical adjustment to each shock
separately. The fact that in the cycle there
is never that complete adjustment to the exist-
ing state of affairs that is present in the as-
sumed initial Elysian state of moving equilib-
rium is of no decisive importance.It merely
means that one state of incomplete adjustment
succeeds another and that successive widen-
ings and narrowings of discrepancies between
actual and desired portfolios replace the intro-
duction of a discrepancy and the correction of
it.As noted parenthetically earlier, of some-
what more moment are the fluctuations in real
income and employment over the cycle, which
introduce an important reason for overshoot-
ing.
The central element inthe transmission
mechanism, as we have outlined it, is the con-
cept of cyclical fluctuations as the outcome
of balance sheet adjustments, as the effects on
flowsofadjustments between desired and
actual stocks.Itisthis interconnection of
stocks and flows that stretches the effect of
shocks out in time, produces a diffusion over
different economic categories, and gives rise
to cyclical reaction mechanisms. The stocks
serve as buffers or shock absorbers of initial
changes in rates of flow, by expanding or con-
tracting from their "normal" or "natural" or
"desired" state, and then slowly alter other
flows as holders try to regain that state.
In this stock-flow view, money is a stock
in a portfolio of assets, like the stocks of fi-
nancial assets, or houses, or buildings, or in-
ventories, or people, or skills.It yields a flow
of services as these other assets do; it is also
subject to increase or decrease through inflows
and outflows, also as the other assets are.It
is because our thinking has increasingly moved
in this direction that it has become natural to
us to regard the rate of change in the stock of
money as comparable to income flows and to
regard changes in the rate of change as a gen-
erating force in producing cyclical fluctuations
in economic activity.
Summary
The statistical evidence on the role of money
in business cycles assembled in the first section
demonstrates beyond any reasonable doubt that
the stock of money displays a systematic
cyclical behavior. The rate of change in the
money stock regularly reaches a peak before
the reference peak and a trough before the ref-
erence trough, though the lead is rather vari-
able. The amplitude of the cyclical movement
in money is closely correlated with the ampli-
tude of the cyclical movement in general busi-
ness and is about half as large as the amplitude
of cyclical movements in money income. The
most important single determinant, from the
supply side, of the cyclical pattern of money
is the cyclical pattern in the division of the
public's money holdings between currency and
deposits. The stock of money is much more
closely and systematically related to income
over business cycles than isinvestment or
autonomous expenditures.
In the second section we suggested plausible
interpretations of these facts, pointing out that
the close relation tells nothing directly about
whether the cyclical changes in money are
simply a consequence of the changes in income
or are in large measure the source of those
changes. For major movements in income, we
concluded that there is an extremely strong
case for the proposition that sizable changes in
the rate of change in the money stock are a
necessary and sufficient condition for sizable
changes in the rate of change in money income.
For minor movements, we concluded that,
while the evidence was far less strong, itis
plausible to suppose that changes in the stock
of money played an important independent
role, though certainly the evidence for these
minor movements does not rule out other inter-
pretations. In the subsection, "Conclusions for
Major Movements," we formalized one ele-
ment of a theory designed to account for the
observed tendency of cyclical fluctuations in
income to be wider in amplitude than cyclical
fluctuations in money are. The theory, plus
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statistical estimate of what we call the money
multiplier, or the ratio of the percentage change
in income to the associated percentage change
in the stock of money. The independent esti-
mate was 1.84;thedirectly observed ratio
2.0. This agreement does not reflect any com-
mon statistical origin of the two estimates. It
therefore suggests that further elaboration of
the theory might be well worthwhile.
Finally, in the last section, we sketched in
broad strokes the kind of transmission mechan-
ism that could explain how monetary changes
can produce cyclical fluctuations in income, and
thatisconsistent with our knowledge of
economicinterrelationships.The finalplc-
ture that might ultimately develop out of
this sketch could be of a partly self-generat-
ing cyclical mechanism. Disturbances in the
rate of change in the money stock set in train
a cyclical adjustment mechanism including a
feedback in the rate of change in money itself.
Additional disturbances from time totime
would prevent the fluctuations from dying out.
The mechanism emphasizes the reciprocal ad-
justment of stocks to flows, with money play-
ing a key role as a component of the stock of
assets. We emphasize that this sketch is ex-
ceedingly tentative and, of course, not pre-
clusive. The mechanism outlined can be com-
bined with other adjustment mechanisms.
COMMENT
HYMAN P. MINSKY,
University of California, Berkeley
Friedman and Schwartz examine monetary
factorsin economic fluctuations.Monetary
factors are narrowly defined as "...therole
of the stock of money and changes in the
stock." The authors cast "the 'credit' market
as one of the supporting players rather than a
starperformer."Apparently the plot was
changed after the show was cast for, with the
possible exception of the last section of the
paper ("A Tentative Sketch of the Mechanism
TransmittingMonetaryChanges"),where
portfolio adjustments are introduced in a not
very precise way into the discussion of the
channels by which monetary changes lead to
output changes, credit has a walk-on rather
than a supporting role. Since the authors cite
Fisher as authority for the "dance of the do!-
lar" view of business cycles, we can suppose
they are familiar with and chose to ignore
Fisher's"debt deflation" view ofbusiness
cycles in which the behavior of the capital and
credit markets is a star performer in generat-
ing deep depressions.'
The proposition Friedman and Schwartz as-
sert to be true is that the business cycles of
experience —chronicledby the National Bu-
reau of Economic Research reference cycles —
11. Fisher:Booms and Depressions, New York, 1932;
idem,"The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions,"
Econometrica, Oct. 2933, pp. 337—357.
can be explained in the sense of being caused
by the behavior of the money supply. Accord-
ing to their view, however, the monetary event
that calls the tune for economic activity is
neither the supply of money nor a change in
the supply of money; rather, itis a change
in the rate of change in the supply of money
that is the critical variable. The accelerator
view of the way in which monetary changes
operate to affect economic activity can be linked
to an accelerator formulation of business cycle
behavior quite easily by way of the need to
finance externally part of the induced invest-
ment during periods of expansion.2 As the au-
thors show no interest in integrating their ex-
plorations of the supply of money with an
income-expenditure view of business cycles,
this possibility is ignored.
The authors make their point of view clear
when, in commenting upon the recent revival
of interest in monetary policy, they assert
"this fair-weather source of support for the im-
portance of money is a weak reed." Belief in
a narrowly defined monetary explanation of
business cycles is implicitly a matter of ideo-
logical importance. Hence we can expect the
authors to engage in a hard sell of a point of
view. In the process of selling their viewpoint
the authors invent "plausible interpretations
of the factual evidence" and "a plausible ra-
2H.P. Minsky: "Monetary Systems and Accelerator
Models," American Economic Review, Dec. 2957, pp.85g-.
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tionalization of our empirical findings," they
cite as supporting evidence both work in prog-
ress and material not generally available, and
they ignore evidence that does not support
their views, such as the fiscal relations in the
1937—38 recession and the success of short-run
forecasting models which place littleor no
emphasis upon monetary phenomena.
The Friedman and Schwartz paper contains
a number of ingenious studies and construc-
tions, some of which I feel sure will prove to
be of lasting value. However, the argument
does not depend solely upon these studies;it
is also based upon their reading of history and
the relations they derive between changes in
the rate of change in the stock of money as
given by their time series (money to them al-
most always includes time deposits in com-
mercial banks) and the National Bureau's ref-
erence cycle chronology.
Two classes of business cycles, mild and
deep depression cycles, are identified. Twenty-
one business cycles are recorded as occurring
between 1870 and 1960, of which six were deep
depression cycles. The mild depression cycles
are associated by the authors with increases and
decreases in the positive rate of growth of the
money supply, whereas the deep depression
cycles are associated with significant decreases
in the money supply.3 Two of the decreases
in the stock of money, those of 1919—20 and
1937—38, can be identified as the result of
specific actions by the Federal Reserve System.
Neither of the administered decreases in the
money stock was associated with a financial
crisis or panic. In the other four deep depres-
sion cycles a monetary-financialcrisis was
part of the process by which the money supply
was decreased. An explanation which makes
financial crises endogenous rather than exog-
enous events seems to be required to complete
the monetary explanation of business cycles.
ToonewhoremembersSchumpeter's
Kitchen, Juglar, and Kondratief cycles, the
chronology of major and minor cycles in the
Friedman and Schwartz paperrecallsthe
phrase "3 Kitchens and then a Juglar," for
three mild depression cycles separated the
deep depression cycles following 1873, 1893,
1907 and 1920, and two mild recession cycles
occurred between the deep depression cycles
that began in 1920 and 1929. The 1929 and
1937 deep depression cycles were not separated
by any mild depression cycles. As the declines
in the money supply associated with the 1920
and the 1937 contractions can be related to
administrative actions, the deviation from the
Schumpeterian sequence inthe post—World
War I period can be laid to the effects of inter-
vention. The chronology of major and minor
cycles lends some weight to the proposition
that the necessary conditions for a financial
crisis emerge as a result of the financial rela-
tions that develop during an extended period in
which growth is interrupted only by mild de-
pressions. The events since 1920 indicate that
the sequence of events leading to severe business
cycles can be modified by central bank action:
the hope isthat, with increased knowledge,
lender-of-last-resort acts by the central bank
can prevent serious financial crises.
I have organized the body of my comments on
the Friedman and Schwartz paper around two
topics, the importance of m9ney and the trans-
mission mechanism.
The Importance of Money
Friedman and Schwartz argue that "money is
important." This slogan can be interpreted in
a number of ways. The belief that money is
important is not inconsistent with acceptance
of the basic validity of the modern income-
expenditure approach to business cycles. To
one holding such a view, the nonexistent or
primitive monetary and financial system incor-
porated in income and expenditure models such
as those of Duesenberry, Eckstein, and Fromm,
of Klein, and of Suitsis a defect that should
4J. S. Duesenberry, 0. Eckstein, and G. Fromm, "A
Simulation of the United States Economy in Recession,"
Econometrica, Oct. ig6o, pp.749—809.There are many
Klein models, one of the most recent is L. Klein, "A Post-
war Quarterly Model: Description and Applications," pre-
8 Friedman and Schwartz associate two "mild" declines
in the money stock (1948—49 and 1959—6o) with mild busi-
ness contractions. Those mild declines were about one-half
as large as the smallest of the declines they consider to be
significant. On the other hand, the largest of the decreases
they consider to be significant was about 15 times as large
as the smallest "significant" one (all decreases are measured
as a percentage decline in the money stock). The authors
do not explain why the break between mild and deep de-
pressions has been associated with the difference between
1.3percent and 2.4percent declines in the money supply.66 MONEY AND BUSINESS CYCLES
be corrected. Holders of this position with re-
spect to the importance of money would argue
that serious work on monetary and financial
interrelationsis needed in order to improve
upon what we now know. Even though the
current models are adequate predictors of short
and relatively mild movements of income and
so forth, they are deficient, because in their
present form they are not able to generate the
more extreme movements characteristic of deep
depressions andinflations.The conjecture
guiding research would be that the completion
of these models, so that they could encompass
such broader possibilities, would entail the use
of a more sophisticated model of money and
finance: in particular relations which state how
money and financial institutions behave, and
how portfolio adjustments and financial liabili-
ties affect the various sectors would have to be
incorporated into the more complete model.
Another interpretation of the phrase "money
is important" would reject the basic validity of
the income-expenditure approach.The ob-
served path of money income and prices is in-
terpreted as the result of shocks imposed upon
an otherwise inherently stable growth process
by random or systematic changes in either the
nominal quantity of money or the rate of change
in the money supply. In this view, the introduc-
tion of a money supply that behaves in the cor-
rect manner would eliminate either all or at
least a large part of those disturbances that
constitute the major malfunctioning of an en-
terprise system. The effects of changes in the
stock of money and changes in the rate of
changes in the stock of money are independent
of the financial interrelations underlying the
monetary system, as well as of the other finan-
cial usages and institutions which exist.Basi-
cally, the nominal supply of money calls the
tune and money income and prices follow, per-
haps with a lag.
Almost always Friedman and Schwartz seem
to adopt the second interpretation of the im-
portance of money and they thereby reject the
validity of the income-expenditure approach to
business cycles.However, at times they do
pared for an NBER conference on Research in Income and
Wealth, 1962.D.B. Suits, "Forecasting with an Econo-
metric Model," American Economic Review, Mar. 1962,pp.
104—132.
come within hailing distance of the first inter-
pretation,particularlywhentheyassert:
"clearly the view that monetary change is im-
portant does not preclude the existence of other
factors that affect the course of business or that
account for the quasi-rhythmical character of
business fluctuations. We have no doubt that
other factors play a role."
They go on to state:
A fully satisfactory explanation of the minor move-
ments would require an explicit and rigorously stated
theory, which could take the form of a series of
simultaneousdifferentialequationsdescribingthe
reaction mechanism of the economy, together with
a specification of the joint distribution function of
the random disturbances impinging onit,and a
specification of the systematic disturbances that could
be introduced into it.Our belief that money plays
an important role in minor movements is equivalent
to asserting that some of the differential equations
would contain the stock of money as a variable, that
disturbances in the stock of money are among the
random or systematic disturbances impinging upon
the system, and that these disturbances alone would
be capable of generating a path for such major eco-
nomic variables as money income, prices, output and
the like, comparable to the path they actually follow
during mild depression cycles.
The first sentence of this quotation is of course
a statement of the content of the income-expend-
iture prediction models. The conjecture that
-.these[monetary]disturbancesalone
would be capable of generating a path.
comparable..."to the observed path could
be interpreted as a hypothesis to be tested
within a specific income-expenditure model.I
happen to believe that the introduction of
monetary and the related financial phenomena
only by way of the stock of money as a variable
in the equation system would turn out to be
not tenable; that any serious work on monetary
phenomena in relation to business cycles will
result in the inclusion in the system of variables
and equations that reflect not only the money
stock but alsothe asset structureofthe
monetary authorities and the financial liabil-
ities of other units.Nevertheless, the view
expressed in the above quotation of the role
of money in determining system behavior is
within working-hypothesis distance of the in-
come-expenditure approach.
However, the dominant theme of Friedman
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equation system is not needed in order to under-
stand the essential business-cycle properties of
the economy.
There seems to us, accordingly, to be an extraordi-
narily strong case for the propositions that (i)ap-
preciable changes in the rate of growth of the stock
of money are a necessary and sufficient condition for
appreciable changes in the rate of growth of money
income; and (2)thatthis is true both for long secular
changes and also for changes over periods roughly the
length of business cycles. To go beyond the evidence
and discussion thus far presented: our survey of ex-
perience leads ustoconjecture that the longer-
period changes in money income produced by a changed
secular rate of growth of the money stock are reflected
mainly in different price behavior rather than in dif-
ferent rates of growth of output; whereas the shorter-
period changes in the rate of growth of money stock
are capable of exerting a sizeable influence on the
rate of growth of output as well.
The more modest view of the part played by
the stock of money and changes in the stock
of money is taken when Friedman and Schwartz
discuss minor movements; the stronger view is
taken when they discuss major movements.
However, they argue: "If money plays an in-
dependent role in major movements, is it likely
to be almost passive in minor movements? The
minor movements can be interpreted as less
virulent members of the same species as the
major movements. Is not a common explana-
tion for both more appealing than separate ex-
planations, especially when there is no well-
tested alternative separate explanation?"If
both major and minor movements are to be
explained by the same process, then either both
are generated by a complex interdependent
system in which nonmonetary factors are ca-
pable of generating the observed movements, or
both are generated by random or systematic
shocks from the supply of money. Another of
their statements requires comment: "The case
for a monetary explanation is not nearly so
strong for the minor U.S. economic fluctuations
." and for minor movements they cannot
rule out "...thepossibility that the close re-
lation between money and business reflected
primarily the influence of business on money."
It seems to me that Friedman and Schwartz
really have to choose between accepting a dual
theory, in which major fluctuations are some-
thing different from minor fluctuations or, if
they insist upon a theory that covers both major
and minor cycles, they can accept a view that
factors other than the narrowly monetary phe-
nomena are important in generating both types
of business cycles.
I believe the adoption of the middle ground
between the Friedman and Schwartz position
and the models that operate with a skeletal
monetary and financial system would be a most
fruitful research strategy. The working hypoth-
esis should take the form of a model that
integrates a more complete monetary and finan-
cial system into an income-expenditure frame-
work,inparticular,financial commitments
along with financial assets should be integrated
into the various behavior equations. One aim
of such an integrated model would be to explain
what is admittedly an open aspect of the Fried-
man and Schwartz narrow monetary interpre-
tation of business cycles, which isthat "It
leaves open the reasons for the change in the
rate of growth of the money stock and, indeed,
at this point is highly eclectic, taking account
of the fact that historically there have been
many different reasons." That is, an objective
of such a more complete model would be to
explain not only money income but also how
monetary and financial crises are generated.
Elsewhere I have worked with a model in
which the need to deficit finance private invest-
ment during a period of sustained growth (a
period in which economic growth is interrupted
by only mild recessions) results in an ever-
increasing portion of income flows being needed
to service financial commitments.5 Such chang-
ing relations between income receipts and pay-
ments due to financial commitments generate
an unstable situation in which a not abnormal
initial decline in income can explode, by way of
financial repercussions, into a major decline in
income. The not abnormal initial decline in
income, which triggers the large movement of
financial variables, is explained by a dynamic
income-flow model. In such a model the modest
income-induced changes in the rate of change
in money, that give pause to Friedman and
Schwartz when they assess the role of money in
'H. P. Minsky, "Financial Crises, Financial Systems and
the Performance of the Economy," to appear in Private
Capital Markets, Vol. XVI, The Supporting Papers, Corn-
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minor cycles, can be one of a number of
elements that may generate the not abnormal
initiating decline in income.
Once the financial repercussions of the need
to deficit finance private investment are known,
we are in a position to investigate whether the
financial impact necessary to generate a severe
depression can occur in the absence of a marked
decline in the money supply. Can a serious
debt deflation occur even though the nominal
supply of money remains constant or expands?
An implication of the Friedman and Schwartz
explanation of business cycles is that, even if
sharp declines in asset prices and net worth
occur owing to a financialcrisiscentering
around the nonmonetary part of the financial
system, no serious depression will take place,
for they assert that without a large decline in
the nominal money supply no deep depression
can occur.
The Transmission Mechanism
Friedman and Schwartz say, "... weshall
not be persuaded that the monetary changes are
the source of economic changes unless we can
specify in some detail the mechanism that con-
nects the one with the other." The market
processes they specify as connecting the two
are consistent with the liquidity-preference
doctrine as to how money affects income. To
this reader, the connections they specify de-
crease the difference between a monetary and
an income-expenditure explanation of business
cycles, almost to the point where it is a matter
of the specification of the interest elasticity of
various classes of expenditures.
An empiricalfindingofFriedman and
Schwartz is that the changes in the rate of
change in the money supply have a long and
rather variable lead over the business cycle
peaks and troughs. In order to generate such
lags, the authors believe that the connection
between money and demand must be complex;
the mechanism they sketch requires that various
financial and real markets be affected by reper-
cussions of the initiating monetary change be-
fore income responds. Any process that results
in such long and variable leads can also result
inconsiderable slippage between monetary
changes and the presumably resultant changes
in income. As Keynes put it, "If however we
are tempted to assert that money is the drink
which stimulates the system to activity, we
must remind ourselves that there may be sev-
eral slips between the cup and the lip" (The
General Theory of Employment, Interest and
Money, New York, 1963,p.173).
Therelevant question in regard to the sig-
nificance of monetary changes is whether the
lag (and slippage) of income changes following
changes in the money stock (or its rate of
change) is so large and variable that it is not
feasible, under all circumstances, to operate on
the money stock in order to achieve desired
changes in income. But the feasibility of using
changes in the money supply to affect income
depends upon the channels through which a
monetary change affects income. (In what fol-
lows I shall be examining an increase in the
money supply, or in its rate of change: the
argument for a decrease is quite similar aside
from the possibility of a liquidity crisis.)
Two models of how bank operations change
the supply of money can be distinguished: these
can be labeled the open market and the com-
mercial loan 6models.Open market operations
by banks and monetary authorities result in
changes in the money supply due to a substitu-
tion of money for income-earning assets in
portfolios. Aside from the effects of interest
rate changes, no change in the total value of
the assets and the financial liabilities of the
other sectors result.Commercial loan opera-
tions result in changes in the money supply due
to acquisition by the banks and authorities of
newly created financial liabilities of other sec-
tors.The consolidated financial assets and
liabilities of these other sectors change with
the money supply.7
In addition to the open market and com-
mercial loan routes to a change in the money
stock, the money stock can be changed by the
production of the monetary commodity (either
by mining or international trade) and the crea-
tion of fiat money. Aside from the creation of
6am not happy with this label.
'Commercial loan operations include, not only business
lending by banks and rediscounting by the monetary
authorities of business paper, but also acquisition by banks
and authorities of corporate and government bonds, mort-
gages, etc., either directly from the issuer or from a financial
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fiat money to pay off government debt —which
as far as I know has not taken place in the
United States since —thelink between
changes in the money supply by these tech-
niques and changes in demand is direct.8 Hence
these ways of changing the money supply are
in terms of their direct effect upon income quite
analagous to commercial loan operations; the
analogy breaks down, in that no increase in
private debt accompanies these changes.
Throughout most of the period under con-
sideration the United States was on a gold
standard—commercial loan monetary system;
open market operations were utilized by com-
mercial banks and the central bank for only
relatively short periods, when the demand for
new financing was not sufficiently vigorous to
utilize the commercial banks' ability to acquire
assets. Since World War II the United States
has been on a mixed open market operations—
commercial loan monetary system, in which the
Federal Reserve System has affected reserves
of commercial banks by purchasing govern-
ment debt from the market and, on the whole,
the commercial banks have acquired newly
created private debt. (Commercial banks have
engagedin open market purchases during
recessions and open market sales and com-
mercial loan operations during expansions. The
resulting trend has shown a net change in com-
mercial bank liabilities, offset by assets which
were acquired as the result of commercial loan
operations.) The only recent period in which
both monetary institutions operated mainly by
way of open market purchases was following
the 1929 crash (although the increasing nation-
al debt and the various silver purchasing acts
gave the operations some of the characteristics
of commercial loan operations).
Friedman and Schwartz state: "The most
important [evidence in support of the mone-
tary explanation of business cycles]isthe
fact that the relation between money and busi-
ness has remained largely unchanged over a
period that has seen substantial changes in the
arrangementsdeterminingthequantityof
money. During part of the period, the United
8An increase in the money supply by means of a gold
flow that results in portfolio investment within the recipient
country by the gold importer —suchas occurred during the
hot money epoch of the x93o's—is analogous to an open
market rather than to a commercial loan operation.
States was on an effective gold standard, during
part, on an inconvertible paper standard with
floating exchange rates, during part, on a man-
aged paper standard with fixed exchange rates.
The commercial banking system changed its
role and scope greatly. The government ar-
rangements for monetary control altered, the
Federal Reserve System replacing the Treasury
as the formal center of control. And the cri-
teriaofcontrol adopted by the monetary
authorities altered." The above changes are
mostly irrelevant to the relation between mon-
etary changes and aggregate demand; they are
primarily legal and organizational.(I do not
know what Friedman and Schwartz mean by
"The commercial banking system changed its
role and scope greatly.")Throughout that
period, the largest part of the increases in the
money stock was associated with the acquisition
by the banks of newly created financial assets;
almost always, the largest portion of these
financial assets were the liabilities of private
units; and almost always these financial assets,
acquired in exchange for net changes in the
money supply, were linked with investment ex-
penditures or the holding of capital goods or
financial assets. No matter how substantial the
institutional and organizational changes have
been, they have not seriously affected the eco-
nomic relations underlying a change in the
money supply: the largest part of the change
in the money stock throughout the period was
the result of commercial loan operations by
commercial banks.
Following open market operations, the chan-
nel connecting the monetary change and a
change in income involves portfolio adjustments
and changes in relative prices.In order to
generate an increase in private-sector demand,
either the price of services must fall relative to
the price of assets, which may lead to an in-
crease in consumption demand; or the price of
secondhand nonfinancial assets must rise rela-
tive to the price of new assets, which may lead
to an increase in investment demand. What
happens to the demand for services depends not
only upon what is happening to the interest rate
but also upon what is happening to consumers'
disposable income or, if you wish, to consumers'
views as to what is happening to their "perma-
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hand nonfinancial assets relative to new non-
financial assets will generate an increase in
investment only if, after the increase, the price
of secondhand assets is not appreciably lower
than the price of new assets. Given that the
rate of decline in asset prices during the initial
stages of a serious depression is greater than the
rate of decline in money wages, a sharp fall in
income will result in a price level of secondhand
assets that is low relative to the production cost
of new assets. Hence, a significant rise in in-
vestment demand cannot be expected to follow
closely upon a modest rise in the relative price
of used as compared with new assets such as
would result from a fall in interest rates. The
recovery of investment in such circumstances
will follow upon the more marked rise in the
relative price of used as against new assets,
owing to the effects of the elimination of excess
capacity by way of depreciation and obsoles-
cence, all of which operate quite independently
of interest rate changes. That is, the relevant
investment demand functions will not be inter-
est elastic but will be responsive to factors that
fitnaturallyintoanincome-expenditure
framework °
Followingcommercial loan operations by the
monetary authorities and commercial banks,
the connection between a change in the money
supply and a change in income is direct. The
units which generate the newly created liabili-
ties acquired by the monetary system will do
so because they wish to purchase either finan-
cial or real assets. The portfolio adjustment
portion of the connection between a monetary
change and a change in income is not operative
in the initial stages of the adjustment following
a commercial loan operation. The channel be-
tween an increase in money and a net increase
° Friedmanand Schwartz trace the effects of an
initial open market operation, their starting point is "an
Elysian State of moving equilibrium." From such an initial
condition the change in relative prices associated with in-
terest rate changes will have an effect upon demand. If the
initial conditions include large price differences between the
market price of used and the production costs of new capital
goods, such as can be expected to exist after a sharp fall in
income, then as has been argued in the text, the relative
price changes following an open market operation increase
in the money supply, will not have an appreciable effect
upon demand. We therefore have a world in which the
reaction to a monetary change depends upon the initial
conditions; which is one of the major attributes of the
Keynesian view.
in the money value of financial and real assets
held by the borrowers is direct. As we are con-
sidering a net increase in assets, unless the
monetary change is wholely absorbed by a rise
in asset prices, additional real or financial assets
must be created in exchange for the money
spent by the initial borrowing unit. The crea-
tion of new real assets is of course investment.
Typically, a monetary change resulting from a
commercial loan operation enables the borrow-
er to make a real or financial market "demand"
effective. The route connecting monetary and
income changes is direct; the lag between the
monetary change and the initial change in
demand will be short and the slippage slight.
Of course the full impact of the monetary
change will be lagged behind the initial in-
crease in the money supply, but this is fully
consistent with the multiplier process.
Given that a strong demand for funds to
finance investment exists and that a portion of
the supply of such funds has been the result
of monetary changes, a decrease in the rate of
increase of the money supply will result in an
increase in the pressure to finance investment
from other sources. In addition to the net flow
of savings and the net debt acquisition by the
monetary system, the substitution of income-
earning assets for money is a source of financ-
ingforinvestment.Velocityincreasing—
liquidity decreasing portfolio changes will fol-
low a decrease in the rate of increase in the
money supply.This isconsistent with the
Friedman and Schwartz findings that velocity
conforms to the reference cycles (Chart 6),
whereas the rate of change in the money supply
leads (Chart 4) the reference cycles.
Of course the commercial loan model of how
the money supply changes begs the question of
what determines the strong demand for funds
to finance investment. Friedman and Schwartz
implicitly assume that a strong investment de-
mand exists when they start from a position of
moving equilibrium, and they also assume that
this investment demand is elastic with respect
to relative interest rates. To an income-expend-
iture theorist, the existence of a strong demand
for funds to finance investment to which a com-
mercial loan monetary system responds requires
explanation. On the basis of the observed over-
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that the flow of technical progress and the feed-
back from past demands has been on the whole
sufficient to generate a buoyant investment de-
mand. However, a corollary of the view that
nonmonetary factors have generated a strong
investment demand throughout most of the
period under consideration is that the income
and financial past of an economy can lead to a
weak investment demand, and a temporary
"saturation" of capital can exist.1°
Friedman and Schwartz, in their example,
specify that the initial change in the rate of
change in the money supply is the result of
central bank open market operations.Even
though they recognize that"... whateverthe
initial impulse, commercial banks will play a
key role in transforming it into an increased
rate of growth in the money stock ...," their
transmissionmechanismoperatesmainly
through portfolio changes which are associated
with changes "covering explicit or implicit
(interest)rates on the whole spectrum of
assets." They pay no attenton to the nature of
the assets acquired by the commercial banks.
A transmission mechanism which operates by
way of financial markets and portfolio changes
is fully consistent with the income-expenditure
approach, but the effect upon income that
Friedman and Schwartz state exists depends
upon a strong reaction to small differences in
relative interest rates.
Even though the commercial loan model of
how the money supply changes yields a more
direct linkage between monetary changes and
income changes than the open market opera-
tions model, it has properties that are incon-
sistent with the narrow monetary view of busi-
ness cycles that Friedman and Schwartz es-
pouse. The link between business debt and the
money supply is direct in the commercial loan
view of the monetary system: hence a feedback
from debt to investment demand is an en-
dogenous repercussion in the money creation
process.In addition, the combination of a
strong investment demand, a money supply
linked with the financing of private investment,
the additional possibility of financing invest-
'°Saturationis really not an accurate label for a situation
during a severe depression, for the excess supply of capital
goods is the result of the fall of incomes substantially below
past incomes.Once demand recovers, such "saturation"
vanishes.
ment by velocity increasing—liquidity decreas-
ing portfolio changes, and theeffect upon
equity and real asset prices of a long run with-
out a major recession can easily lead to a view
that deep depressions are the result of the
development of an unstable debt structure dur-
ing periods in which the economy is a success.
Instead of autonomous monetary changes lead-
ing to deep depressions, the monetary changes
are a result of the debt deflation process of
which Fisher wrote, and the debt deflation is
the result of an unstable debt structure gener-
ated in the process of financing investment
during a period in which sustained growth is
interrupted by only mild recessions.1'
Incidentally, Friedman and Schwartz do not
try to explain the variability of the length of
the lag between a monetary change and the
presumably related income change. I conjec-
ture that an explanation of this phenomena
would center around the actual mix of opera-
tions by which the money supply is changed.
This conjecture is inconsistent with the Fried-
man and Schwartz view that money is money
for, if it is true, the effect of a change in the
quantity of money or its rate of change does
depend upon both the process by which the
money supply is changed and the assets ac-
quired by the money system.'2
Thus, whether we take an open market or a
commercial loan view of how the money supply
is changed, the market processes which follow
are not always satisfactory from the authors'
point of view. With an open market monetary
system the required investment and consump-
tion reaction will not always take place; with a
commercial loan monetary system the develop-
"There may be equilibrium which, though stable,is
so delicately poised that, after departure from it beyond
certain limits, instability ensues, just as, at first, a stick
may bend under strain, ready all the time to bend back,
until a certain point isreached, when itbreaks.This
simile probably applies when a debtor goes "broke," or
when the breaking of many debtors constitutes a "crash,"
after which there is no coming back to the original equilib-
rium."I.Fisher, "The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great
Depressions," Econometrica, Oct. 1933,p.339.
12Theauthors recognize that the effects of a higher rate
of growth of the money supply will differ in detail "de-
pending on the source of the increase," but the sources
they mention are sources of commercial bank reserves or
are determinants of the efficacy of a given amount of re-
serves. They neverexamine the effects of the assets ac-
quired by commercial banks and monetary authorities on
future demand.72 MONEY AND BUSINESS CYCLES
ing private debt structure can feed back upon
future demand for financing.In addition, a
commercial loan monetary system is consistent
with a debt deflation view of how major reces-
sions are generated: a view in which the his-
torically observed changes in the money supply,
particularly those associated with deep depres-
sion, are a result of business behavior.
Conclusion
Ihavenotcommended Friedman and
Schwartz for the many fine and nice points in
their paper. I fully expect that much of their
work will become a part of the body of knowl-
edge that all workers in money will accept as
valid. Nevertheless, I feel they have failed to
make a convincing case for the strong view that
monetary changes fully explain observed busi-
ness cycles. If all they wish to assert is that a
fuller integration of monetary phenomena into
the basically income-expenditure models would
improve these models, then I am sure that there
is wide agreement with Friedman and Schwartz.
But if this more modest view is their position
then I wonder what all the shouting is about.
ARTHUR M. OKUN,
Yale University
"Money and Business Cycles" is an impor-
tant addition to previous studies by Friedman
and his associates on the relationship between
the stock of money and the level of economic
activity.The empirical findingsoffered by
Friedman and Schwartz are impressive. No-
body can justly quarrel with their claim that
the paper "demonstrates beyond any reason-
able doubt that the stock of money displays a
systematic cyclical behavior." But, as the au-
thors point out with care and clarity, these
empirical results are just as consistent with
the view that changes in aggregate activity
influence the money supply as they are with the
position that changes in the money supply af-
fect economic activity. While we can all agree
that the lines of causation run in both direc-
tions, the key conclusion of their paper is that
the causality runs substantially from money to
income, substantially enough to warrant a
monetary theory of business cycles.Indeed,
the monetary view of economic fluctuations
stands as the principal characteristic of Fried-
man's extensive research in this area.
To state my own principal conclusion di-
rectly, I do not agree with the Friedman and
Schwartz appraisal of the importance of money.
I find their view of the world fascinating and
stimulating, but I am not converted.So far,
this rejection stands merely as a testament of
my faith. I shall use these comments to explain
my misgivings about their theoretical position.
The Money Multiplier
In effect, Friedman and Schwartz ask me to
believe that a $i billion open market purchase
of governmentsecuritieswillraiseannual
GNP by more than $20 billion. The $i billion
rise in high-powered money should increase
total money by more than $5billion,or more
than 2 per cent.(That is my estimate —not
that of the authors —butI would not expect
serious argument.)In turn, according to the
Friedman and Schwartz estimate of 2 for the
elasticity of net national product with respect
to money, this expansion of the money supply
should raise national product by more than 4
per cent —ormore than $20 billion.
This money multiplierestimate hasex-
tremely significant implications for economic
policy.It brings monetary policy to the fore
and pushes fiscal policy into the background.
To see these implications concretely, consider
a combined fiscal-monetary action whereby a
reduction in personal taxes of $x billionis
financed entirely by the creation of new high-
powered money. This action may be divided
into two steps. The first step consists of a
purely fiscal action: taxes are cut by $i billion
and the reduction is financed by an issue of
interest-bearingmarketable governmentse-
curities.The second step is then a purely
monetary action: the central bank buys the
$i billion of government securities for cash on
the open market. The combined multiplier-
accelerator effects on GNP of the fiscal action
might be estimated anywhere from $1.5 to $5
billion,but nobody's estimate of that step
would approach the $20 billion attributed to
the monetary action, in line with Friedman and
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that the monetary step generates 8o to 90 per
cent of the total stimulus in the combined
action.
Under typical conditions in the American
economy, I would be inclined to reverse the
allocation, putting 8o to 90 per cent of the
weight on the fiscal step.I should expect a
tax rebate that came to its recipients in the
form of readily marketable government secur-
ities (the equivalent of the purely fiscal action)
to be considerably more than half as expan-
sionary as an equal rebate in the form of cash.
In the world we inhabit, money substitutes are
plentiful and fill the spectrum between money
andcapitalgoods.Governmentsecurities
share many of the properties of cash and few
of the characteristics of capital. The form of
the increase in the public's net worth (as be-
tween money and Treasury securities) seems
less vital to aggregate demand than the fact of
this increase generated by the fiscal action.
If Friedman and Schwartz are right, the na-
tion is going far astray in current discussions
of tax reduction, when we can get all the
stimulus we need from moderate shiftsin
monetary policy toward greater ease.Their
verdict on the power of money would not be
accepted by the makers of monetary policy,
their most ardent critics, or the majority of
monetary economists. Even the original archi-
tects of quantity theory expected only half as
much bang from a new buck when they took
proportionality of money and income as a first
approximation. The distance of the Friedman
and Schwartz position from most professional
thinking on stabilization issues does not prove
they are wrong. Collective professional judg-
ment has been in error before, but I am
orthodox enough to believe that it deserves
some credit.
Money and Permanent Income
The quantitative estimates of large monetary
effects on income are vital to the Friedman
and Schwartz qualitative view that money ac-
counts substantially for fluctuations in income.
Percentage fluctuations in the path of money
over cycles are considerably smaller than the
percentage variations in income.The rela-
tively stable money variable can be responsible
for these wide movements in income, only if
money operates on income with great leverage.
Friedman and Schwartz accountfortheir
large estimates of leverage through the perma-
nent income formulation of the demand for
money.The short-run income elasticity of
demand for money is found to be low because
(i) the demand depends on permanent income,
and (2) permanent income varies from year
to year by only an estimated one-third as
much as aggregate measured income.Then,
on the assumption that any imbalance between
supply and demand for cash is equilibrated
by changes in measured income, a change in
the money supply must induce magnified in-
come changes.
If I translate from permanent income to
wealth —justbecause itis a more familiar
language to me for some purposes —Ican
see some point to Friedman's formulation of
the demand for money. While I should expect
the transactions demand for money to contract
along with measured income in a recession, the
asset demand for money will not decline so
long as wealth is growing. Except for the most
severe depressions, wealth in real terms has
kept growing through all phases of the cycle.
But the market valuation of wealth in port-
foliosis presumably most important to the
asset demand for money, and I doubt that the
market value of wealth has fared any better
than incomes have in recessions.If my guess
on wealth values is correct, I see no reason for
a particularly low short-run income elasticity
of demand for money.
In Friedman's view, the short-run elasticity
is low because transitory income is not used
to increase money holdings.Previously, we
were told that transitory income does not go
into current consumption outlays.I will feel
more comfortable about both those proposi-
tions when I am told how and where transitory
income does get allocated.
In sharp contrast to the low short-run in-
come elasticity of demand for money, their
estimate of the long-run elasticity isr.8.I
see no logical reasons for money to be such a
luxury —withan income elasticity rivalling
that of steak —andI am not prepared to ac-
cept the finding as a structural characteristic
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banks are the component of Friedman and
Schwartz money that contributes most to the
large coefficient, I wonder whether the result
may stem from institutional developments af-
fecting the supply conditions for time deposits
by commercial banks.
The Transmission Mechanism
How does a rise in the money supply in-
crease the level of income? Obviously, people
who have been induced to part with an earning
asset and to take on cash cannot simply decide
to get themselves more income and more wealth
in order to restore balance to their portfolios.
Some adjustment and transmission mechanism
must be involved.
I was surprised to find that the transmission
mechanismdescribedbyFriedmanand
Schwartz is so similar to the one I visualize.
In their view and mine, money is one ingredient
of a general equilibrium theory of asset hold-
ings.Changes in the stock of money will
produce waves and ripples that influence the
demand forallassets,extending to newly
produced goods and services. When the mone-
tary authorities induce people to part with
bonds, these people are not really demanding
extra cash to hold. They absorb it as a tem-
porary matter before turning to other earning
assets. When the resulting expansion in the de-
mand for nonmonetary assets gets reflected in
an increased demand for reproducible "capital"
and its services, it stimulates either production
or prices or both. But there are many links
in this chain of asset adjustments running
from cash to capital, and I would expect some
of them to be rather weak links much of the
time.
If monetary factors have the leverage on in-
come that Friedman and Schwartz expect, they
must have a better fulcrum than the general
equilibrium asset model implies. If I accepted
their empirical conclusions, I should be look-
ing carefullyatthe mechanics of"credit
availability."At any time, some firms and
households are prevented from acquiring all
the goods and services they would like because
of their limited ability to borrow. Their port-
folios are not in balance and they remain
hungry for more capital (or more dissaving).
If an expansion of the money supply channels
more funds into the hands of these eager
spenders, it can have a large and direct effect
on aggregate activity. We do not know that
monetary expansion is accompanied by greater
ease of credit in this manner, but this disequilib-
rium. mechanism deserves exploration.
The Role of Interest Rates
The strength of the links in the money-
capital chain depends, in large measure, on the
importance of interest rates as equilibrators
of portfolios. In relying on the general equilib-
rium fulcrum, Friedman and Schwartz contend
that changes in the rates of return on earning
assets do not affect substantially the desired
ratio of money to total wealth (or to permanent
income). In that case, output and prices are
linked rigidly and inexorably to the money
supply.The money-income relationshipis
then the key determinant of the time path of
the system, playing the same dominant role
as the capital-output relationship does in Har-
rod's growth model.
If, however, changes in the opportunity cost
of holding money can make people hold sig-
nificantly more cash in their portfolios, the
chain is weakened and money is no longer an
irresistible force. Over the long run, the econ-
omy can move along any one of a large num-
ber of possible money-income paths so long as
there are compensating changes in rates of
return. In the short run, too, changes in yields
give flexibility to the economy, preventing the
full force of a change in the money supply
from impinging on the demand for output. If
variations in the prices of earning assets put
portfolios back in balance, then the output of
capital goods will be less affected by a chang-
ing money supply.
The Friedman-Schwartz conclusion on the
small role of interest does not rest firmly on
either theoretical or empirical evidence.I am
not satisfied with their discussion of Latané's
results. Latané excludes time deposits of com-
mercial banks from his measure of money;
Friedman and Schwartz offer the opinion that
different definitions of the money supply may
give totally different results on the role of
interest rates.They cannot afford to stopthere. We need to know which set of results
offers the more appropriate guide for estimat-
ing the economic impact of conventional ac-
tions of monetary policy. Furthermore, Fried-
man and Schwartz seem obliged to explain
how time deposits in commercial banks can be
a close substitute for demand deposits and yet
not be closely substitutable for savings bank
deposits, savings and loan shares, and others.
This is one example of a repeated puzzle in
their analysis: asset prices and returns play
a key and oft-cited role in encouraging sub-
stitution among nonmonetary earnings assets,
but somehow do not influence the demand for
those assets which are counted as money.
Nor can I accept the procedures in Fried-
man's quantitative work on the demand func-
tion for money. There, other variables get the
first chance to explain demand while interest
rates wait in line and are given only the op-
portunity to eat the leftovers, the residuals of
the basic equations. Friedman and Schwartz
tell us they are treating money as they would
any other stock of assets, such as houses.I
feel confident they would give much more
prominent treatment to the prices of houses
and rental services in estimating demand for
that stock than Friedman has given to the
opportunity cost of money.
The Direct Link
The Friedman and Schwartz monetary view
of fluctuations is sharply distinguished from
the investment approach.Suppose monetary
impulses were the principal cause of changes
in investment demand and that these invest-
ment changes in turn induced fluctuations in
consumption and additional responses in in-
vestment through a multiplier-accelerator proc-
ess.Then, economic fluctuation could be
equally well described either as a monetary or
an investment phenomenon, and presumably
would be best described as a money-through-
investment matter. But they argue that the
direct route from money to income offers a
more satisfactory explanation than the path
that travels from money to interest to invest-
ment to income.
In espousing the direct linkage of money to
income, Friedman and Schwartz are armed
with the powerful empirical resultsofthe
Friedman and Meiselman study. There, it was
shown that aggregate consumer expenditure
has historically been much more closely related
to the money supply than to the level of
"autonomous expenditures,"definedas net
private investment plus the government def-
icit.I have some reservations about the tests,
particularly the treatment of the government
deficit as autonomous. I also find some of the
results puzzling: for example, (i) the "money
multiplier" is much smaller than Friedman's
other work implies;(2) surprisingly, money
explains consumption better than it explains
investment.Furthermore,theresults may
simply mean that changes in the money supply
can be rather accurately described as "meet-
ing the needs of trade." With all these lines of
defense, I would be less than candid if I dis-
missed the findings. Had I known what vari-
ables were going to be correlated, I would
have been willing to bet my nickel on the side
that turned out to be the decisive loser. Until
and unless there is a satisfactory explanation
of these results, the unconverted cannot rest
easy.
On the other hand, I doubt that Friedman
and Schwartz can feel comfortable with their
explanation of the direct linkage. They point
out that the direct influence of money extends
beyond the items classified as investment in
the national accounts, impinging on consumer
durable goods, consumer inventories of items
classified as nondurable, on the rental services
of capital goods, and perhaps on investment
in human capital. If it were possible to adjust
the national accounts to get a better measure
of capital items, this strategy would be indi-
cated. But the current-capital distinction is a
blurred one and many items may have both
capital and current aspects that defy classifica-
tion. Hence, in their view, precision may be
lost rather than gained by tracing from money
to any concept of capital items before moving
along to the impact on income.
Certainly, any line separating current from
capital items must be a fuzzy one.I share
Friedman's view that major consumer durable
goods belong in the capital account and do not
find them a serious conceptual problem. Else-
where, the range of fuzziness seems small
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relative to the magnitude of total investment
expenditures.The doubtful items listed by
Friedman and Meiselman and by Friedman
and Schwartz look rather trivial to me. The
battle between velocity and the multiplier is
most unlikely to turn upon the impact of
monetary changes on pantry and boudoir
stocks held by households or on private educa-
tional expenditures, and even less likely to
hinge on the substitution of auto rentals for
new car purchases. In general, the difficulties
of drawing a line between capital and current
outlays seem less serious than those associated
with dividing liquid assets between money and
nonmoney.
The Cyclical Mechanism
The monetary cycle outlined by Friedman
and Schwartz is monetary both in its impulse
and its overshoot mechanism.In their ex-
ample, which is explicitly not meant to be pre-
clusive, an increase in the money supply starts
the fluctuation. The cyclical character of the
fluctuation comes from an overshooting mone-
tary cobweb: as prices and incomes adjust to
theexpansionary impactofthe monetary
stimulus, people have to scramble back for
some of the cash they unloaded initially. Pre-
sumably, the authors prefer the double mone-
tary version of the cycle, but it seems worth
noting that they could be "half right."Dis-
turbances of a nonmonetary origin could pro-
duce cyclical movements through the Fried-
man and Schwartz monetary cobweb; alter-
natively, disturbances of a monetary character
could be the usual shocks in a world where the
overshoot mechanism was not monetary.
At first glance, a monetary explanation of
business cycles seems impossible because the
money supply does not decline in many cyclical
recessionsofeconomicactivity.However,
Friedman and Schwartz meet this challenge.
They advance a monetary accelerator hypoth-
esis whereby a slowdown in growth of the
money stock can produce an absolute down-
turn in income. The workings of the monetary
accelerator are not explained lucidly by Fried-
man and Schwartz. It would have been help-
ful if they had included a verbal description of
a cycle that was initiated by a reduced (but
continued positive) growth rate of money.
The following model has some of the char-
acteristics of a monetary accelerator, and I offer
it because it may resemble the Friedman and
Schwartz view:
i.The stock of money determines the de-
sired stock of capital, in line with some rigid
desired portfolio balance.
2.Then,the growth rate of money fixes the
growth rate of desired capital.
3.Investment depends on the excess of de-
sired capital over actual capital.
In a moving state of exponential equilibrium,
the percentage excess of desired over actual
capital must be constant. Now, if the growth
rate of money declines, the growth rate of de-
sired capital falls, reducing the excess of de-
sired over actual capital. As a result, invest-
ment declines absolutely.This is potentially
a cycle model; but, as I see it, the overshoot
mechanism lies in the way investment adjusts
actual to desired stocks. A slowdown in mone-
tary growth can be the initiator of recession in
this world, but it does not look like a double
monetary version of the cycle to me.I look
forward to a more explicit formulation of the
Friedman and Schwartz cycle model in their
future work.
Conclusion
I consider Friedman's works on money a
major challenge to the unconverted. They are
full of stimulating ideas and significant facts
and parameters, and they offer some explana-
tion for all the empirical findings.While I
protest against a few of the empirical proce-
dures, the research techniques generally com-
mand praise and admiration.I find many of
the results and their explanation paradoxical
and implausible, yet I cannot really account for
them on other grounds. So I feel very uneasy.
I wonder whether I can appropriately hold
strong intuitive views about relationships and
parameters I have never estimated.I wonder,
on the other hand, how Friedman can disregard
all intuitive evidence.
In reviewing the Friedman and Schwartz
paper, I feel as though I am commenting on
a highly competent and comprehensive de-
mand study with some astonishing results:
coffee and tea are found to be independent
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close substitutes; bus rides have an estimated
incomeelasticityofi .8;theknowledge
whether a family owns an auto offers no as-
sistance in explaining its outlays for gasoline.
But the values of parameters in aggregative
relationships have far more consequence for
the direction of economic policy and economic
research than any coffee-tea examples. The
disciples and the critics of this school of mon-
etary analysis have a social and a scientific
responsibility to pursue the issues with inten-
sive empirical and theoretical research.
CLARK WARBURTON,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
The conclusions of Milton Friedman and
Anna Schwartz regarding the role of money
in business cycles should be no surprise to
anyone who has surveyed the history of busi-
ness-fluctuation theory.The basic cause of
the phenomena described by economic writers
of the past as financial panics, commercial
crises, revulsions, and depressions has been a
subject of intense controversy and widely di-
verse opinions. However, the most continuous
thread running through the controversy has
been the idea that misbehavior of the monetary
and banking system, in the sense of monetary
developments or central bank policy inducing
contractions in the circulating medium, is the
dominant causal element in the generation of
business downswings of any substantial size.
Also, operations of the banking system in the
direction of substantially expanding the stock
of money have almost universally been re-
garded as the basic element in inflationary
business booms, and particularly the great in-
flations of history, recognizing, of course, that
exigencies of government finance have been
a fundamental force beneath an expansion of
the circulating medium in time of war.
The economic literature focusing on changes
in the stock of money as the dominant causal
forceinthe generation of major business
fluctuations goes back in time throughout and
far beyond the ninety years covered by the
project on which Friedman and Schwartz are
engaged, though no factual study has pre-
viously been made covering so long a span of
time with such thoroughness and competent
analysis.However,thepreviousliterature
contains many descriptions by contemporary
observers of the sequence of events and of
the character of causal relationships. Among
these observations is an emphasis on channels
of influence which are treated lightly in the
authors' sketch of the mechanism transmitting
monetary changes. The theory of the impact
of changes in the stock of money on business
activity, developed over a period of two cen-
turiesbeforepublicationoftheGeneral
Theory, recognized the roleof changes in
interest rates (in the writings of Irving Fisher
and Knut Wicksell, for example) but, in gen-
eral, gave more attention to the process by
which successive uses of new units of money
coming into the economy had an impact on
prices and on business activity, and to the
corresponding process when thecirculating
medium was contracted.In that literature
there was also much emphasis upon business
anticipations and expectations, related to ob-
served factors influencing or expected to in-
fluence the stock of money, such as actual and
pending international specie movements, large
changes in trade balances likely to have an
effect upon such movements, legislation affect-
ing the creation or operations of banks or is-
sue of other forms of circulating medium, and
central bank policy announcements.It was
recognized that these anticipations and ex-
pectations might accelerate or retard —orac-
centuate —theusual impact of changes in the
stock of money on business and consumer de-
cisions, and on some occasions might even
give some of these decisions a priority in time
over the actual changes in the stock of money.
IwouldsuggestthatFriedmanand
Schwartz's findings regarding the variability
of the length of lag between rates of change in
the stock of money and in business conditions
are likely to be found, upon further examina-
tion, to be related to the relative impact, in
different cycles, through these various chan-
nels. His description of the process by which
the initial impact of central bank action, if
conducted through open market operations, is
concentrated among holders of financial assets
and then diffused to the rest of the community
is essentially an analysis of lags, under modern
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central bank action designed to stimulate crea-
tion of additional units of money, the actual
creationofthe increments, and receiptof
those increments by persons and enterprises
who spend them on consumer or capital goods.
It is this part of the monetary theory of the
origin of business fluctuations, as was brought
out in discussions from the floor, that bears
some resemblance to what is called Keynesian
theory.But when increments to and decre-
ments from the money stock were produced
by the banking system without prior action
by a central bank, as was the case in the
United States during half of the period covered
by the Friedman and Schwartz study, the char-
acter of the stimulus to the banks and the lags
in the process were necessarily somewhat dif-
ferent. This, together with recognition of the
role of anticipations and the timing of their
impact, suggests that further analysis, with a
scrutiny of the circumstances surrounding the
various business cycle turning points, might
throw much light on the variability in the
length of the lag which these authors have
found between monetary policy actions and
business cycle turning points.
Friedman and Schwartz's estimate of the
size of what they call the money multiplier —
theratio of the cyclical percentage change in
income associated with the percentage change
in the stock of money —indicatesthat the
cyclical variation in the income velocity of
money isof approximately the same mag-
nitude as the cyclical variation in the stock of
money.This conclusion, together with the
observed leadership of the change in the stock
of money, implies a lag in cyclical changes in
velocitybehindbusinesscyclepeaks and
troughs.But surely velocity can hardly lag
as far behind the cyclical turning points as
the stock of money leads, at least when the
latter is measured by the change in the rate
of change. Let us hope that Friedman and
Schwartz,intheirforthcoming volume on
trends and cycles in the money stock, will in-
clude an analysis of the trends and cycles,
particularly the cycles, in income velocity and
the timing relationship between such cycles
and those in the stock of money. Pursuit of
this question should provide a considerable
degree of enlightenment on the sequential proc-
ess and the direction in which causal factors
operate throughout the course ofbusiness
cycles.